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THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED"
STANDARD: FROM BARVENIK
TO MARASHLIAN
MARK BOBROWSKI*

INTRODucnON

The Massachusetts Zoning Actl provides that "any person ag
grieved"2 by a decision of a permit or special permit granting au
thority3 may appeal the decision by bringing an action in the
appropriate court. Complaints take the form of an administrative
appeal,4 the appeal of a special permit decision,5 the appeal of a
variance decision,6 or some combination thereof. Plaintiffs are lim
ited to "any municipal officer or board"7 and to persons whose
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law. B.A., 1973, Ithaca College;
M.A., 1975, University of Oregon; J.D., 1985, New England School of Law.
1. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 17 (1994), which provides in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals or any special
permit granting authority ... whether or not previously a party to the proceed
ing, or any municipal officer or board may appeal to the ... court ... by
bringing an action within twenty days after the decision has been filed in the
office of the city or town clerk.
Id. The Subdivision Control Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 41, § 8lBB (1994), also requires a
showing of aggrieved status to obtain judicial review. See id. The principles which
guide standing under the Zoning Act are readily transferable to the realm of subdivi
sion control. See Carey v. Planning Bd., 335 Mass. 740, 743-44, 139 N.E.2d 920, 923
(1957); Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 956,642 N.E.2d 1054 (1994); Wind
sor v. Planning Bd., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 650,655,531 N.E.2d 272, 275 (1988).
2. For a discussion of other statutes employing the "aggrieved person" standard,
see Commonwealth v. Dowd, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 164,638 N.E.2d 923 (1994).
3. For the definitions of "permit granting authority" and "special permit granting
authority," see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4OA, § 1A (1994).
4. See §§ 7, 8, 15, 17. Section 8 also establishes that a "person aggrieved" may
commence an administrative appeal (of an adverse decision by the building inspector or
the zoning administrator) by appropriate action before the board of appeals. Id. The
term "person aggrieved" has the same meaning in this context. Green v. Board of Ap
peals, 404 Mass. 571, 573, 536 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1989).
5. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4OA, §§ 9,17 (1994).
6. See §§ 10, 17.
7. Id. The standing of municipal boards or officers is generally not disputed, and
is outside the scope of this Article. For cases in which board standing has been contro
versial, see Dowling v. Board of Health, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 548, 552 N .E.2d 866, 867
(1990) (holding that board of health does not have standing in a zoning dispute);
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property interests will be affected. These persons are said to have
"standing" to bring the action.
Prior to 1992, there had developed a "small but reasonably co
herent body of case law ... explicating the standards for determin
ing aggrievement under [Massachusetts General Laws chapter 40A,
section 17]."8 Generally, standing turns on the issue of "injury."
An aggrieved person is, first and foremost, "one whose legal rights
have been infringed."9 In essence, there must be a showing of some
special injury by the party claiming standing to set him or her apart
from the general public. 1O For obvious reasons, frustrated permit
applicants have little difficulty demonstrating the requisite injury; if
a zoning permit has been denied or stringent conditions imposed,
"legal rights" have assuredly been called into question. But what of
other parties, particularly neighbors hostile to a development pro
posal targeting nearby land? The case law prior to 1992 suggested,
in two dozen reported challenges, that abutters and close neighbors
were entitled to standing.!l In fact, the court developed "presump
tions" to benefit close neighbors. More remote parties were re
quired to demonstrate a stake in the outcome to qualify as
plaintiffs, without the benefit of any presumption.
In 1992, this "reasonably coherent" system for allocating stand
ing came to a halt. The Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Barvenik
v. Board of Aldermen,12 reviewed the test for standing as it had
been applied to situations involving close neighbors appealing a
zoning decision. The court set out two controversiall3 expectations.
First, the court demanded rigorous proof of the "special and differ
ent"l4 injury necessary for standing. In this regard, Barvenik's eviHarvard Square Defense Fund v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491,496,540 N.E.2d
182, 186 (holding that SIngle member of larger board cannot claim standing to challenge
a permit decision), review denied, 405 Mass. 1204, 542 N.E.2d 602 (1989).
8. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 130,597 N.E.2d 48, 50
(1992).
9. Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 N.E.2d
920,922-23 (1949). See the discussion in the text accompanying infra notes 117-18.
10. In general, "[i]t [is] not enough ... [to] have ... a general civic interest in the
enforcement of the zoning ordinance." Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass.
App. Ct. 210, 218, 326 N.E.2d 348, 353 (1975). See also Green v. Board of Appeals, 404
Mass. 571, 574, 536 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1989).
11. See discussion infra part III.
12. 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 597 N.E.2d 48.
13. See, e.g., Michael Halley, Appeals Court Addresses 'Aggrieved Person' Status,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 28, 1995, at B3 ("The Appeals Court ... has evinced an
unprincipled bias against standing .... [The court has] ignored precedent, abandoned
prudence and abdicated restraint in denying plaintiffs' standing to sue.").
14. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 132,597 N.E.2d at 51.
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dentiary demands, particularly those requiring a showing that the
plaintiff has suffered an "injury in fact," closely tracked the ruling
of the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild
life (Lujan II),15 decided only six weeks earlier.1 6 When standing is
contested, particularly in the context of a motion for summary judg
ment or during the course of trial, Barvenik (and Lujan II) insist
upon more than mere "speculative personal opinion" or
"[s]ubjective and unspecific fears"17 to show injury. Barvenik re
quires that a plaintiff provide:
specific evidence demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the
[decision] will result, if not in a diminution in the value of his
property, at least in his property or legal rights being more ad
versely affected by the activity authorized by the permit than (a)
they are by present uses and activities or (b) they would be as a
result of the uses and activities permitted as of right on the ...
locus. 1s

In a series of cases following Barvenik,19 the appeals court has care
fully explained the scope of this evidentiary burden.
In equating injury with diminution in value, the appeals court
made its second expectation clear. Standing, for close neighbors, is
limited to those with "legitimate" zoning-related concems20_traf
fic increases, parking problems, or the potential for litter-that may
cause diminution in value or economic harm. Aesthetic considera
tions, including neighborhood appearance, incompatible architec
tural styles, and the diminution of neighborhood ambiance, "are all
considered insufficient bases for aggrievement. "21
The result was an unintended revolution in practice and proce
dure in land use law. Simply put, Barvenik and its progeny re
moved the predictability from standing. Decisions reported prior to
15. 504 u.s. 555 (1992) [hereinafter Lujan II]. For a discussion of the "injury in
fact" reqUirement, see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
16. Lujan II was decided on June 12, 1992. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 555. Barvenik
was decided on August 3,1992. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. O. at 129, 597 N.E.2d at 48. In
a telephone interview on December 6, 1995, Justice Laurence, the author of Barvenik,
indicated that Lujan II had played a considerable role in his decision. Telephone Inter
view with Justice Laurence, Massachusetts Appeals Court (Dec. 6, 1995). Indeed, the
case is extensively quoted in Barvenik, and in later decisions in the Barvenik line.
17. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 132,597 N.E.2d at 51. See also Lujan II, 504
U.S. at 560-61.
.
18. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 133,597 N.E.2d at 51.
19. See discussion infra part IV.
20. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 133,597 N.E.2d at 51.
21. Id.
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1992 indicated an overwhelming likelihood that close neighbors

challenging a permit decision would be granted access to the
court.22 A survey of trial court decisions from 1993 to 1995 indi
cates that this was no longer true: in the post-Barvenik trial courts,
close neighbors were routinely dismissed from zoning disputes. 23
As a result, a challenge to standing became de rigueur. Barvenik
did nothing if not encourage a full-scale war at an early stage in the
litigation over the standing of neighbors with obvious costly
consequences.
In Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Appeals,24 decided in 1996,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts belatedly attempted
to rein in the runaway Barvenik ruling. The court's divided opin
ion25 held that a finding by a trial judge as to standing should not be
overturned unless clearly erroneous. 26 Barvenik's lack of deference
to this standard was thereby corrected. The court also quarreled
with Barvenik's statement of the threshold for injury in fact, and
reduced that test to a mere factor for consideration.27 Other impor
tant aspects of Barvenik were left intact.
This Article will trace the changes worked by the Barvenik line
of cases as the rulings percolated through the system from the trial
courts to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Part I will ex
plore basic concepts of the doctrine of standing. The decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts will be reviewed in order to place Barvenik and
Marashlian in proper perspective. Part II will examine the proce
dural issues surrounding the doctrine, detailing the evidentiary ex
pectations of the court as the issue is raised at various times in
proceedings. Part III will look at the doctrine of standing as it was
applied in pre-Barvenik zoning decisions. Part IV will take a close
look at the Barvenik line of cases, all emanating from the Massa
chusetts Appeals Court. Trial court decisions following Barvenik
will also be inventoried in this section. Part V will review
Barvenik's reception at the Supreme Judicial Court, with a thor
ough discussion and critique of the Marashlian decision. Finally,
22. See discussion infra part III.
23. See discussion infra part IV.B.
24. 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369 (1996).
25. Marashlian was a four to three decision. Justices Liacos, Wilkins, Abrams,
and Fried formed the majority, with Justices O'Connor, Greaney, and Lynch in dissent.
Id.
26. Id. at 725, 660 N.E.2d at 374.
27. - Id. at 724, 660 N.E.2d at 373.
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the conclusion will offer some practical guidance to navigate the
post-Marashlian era.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF STANDING

The doctrine of standing has evolved in both the federal and
state courts. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
honed its test for standing to attack administrative action, particu
larly as that standard is applied to parties who are not the objects of
the administrative decision-making. The approach of the United
States Supreme Court has been, in part, borrowed by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which has its own interpretation of
the doctrine. In order to appreciate the Massachusetts Appeals
Court's position in Barvenik, which owes no small debt to prece
dent, it must be viewed in these parallel contexts. These contexts
also enable a more reasoned critique of the Marashlian decision.
A.

The Federal Context

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power
of the federal courts to the resolution of "cases" and "controver
sies."28 Several administrative law doctrines-including ripeness,29
mootness,30 political question,31· and standing-trace their purpose
to Article III. These doctrines relate "in part, and in different
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intui
tion but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitu
28. u.s. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
29. "Ripeness ... is concerned primarily with the institutional relationships be
tween courts and agencies, and the competence of the courts to resolve disputes without
further administrative refinement of the issues." Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 814 F.2d 731,735 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Ripeness looks to "the fitness of the issues
for judicial determination and the hardship of the parties that would result from grant
ing or denying review. . . . [I]n essence, it asks whether he may be attempting to short
circuit the administrative process or whether he has been reasonably diligent in protect
ing his own interests." Id. The leading Supreme Court decision on the issue of ripeness
is undoubtedly Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
30. "A justiciable controversy is ... distinguished from a difference or dispute of
a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. The contro
versy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having ad
verse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion ad
vising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,240-41 (1937) (citations omitted).
31. The political question doctrine suggests that certain matters are inherently
political in nature and ought not to be the subject of judicial review. The doctrine
applies in a variety of circumstances, nicely summarized in the leading case of Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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tional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government."32 The case
or controversy doctrine, and its corollary rules, help to ensure the
separation of powers upon which the federal government is
founded. 33
The Supreme Court has called standing the "most important of
these doctrines."34 It is not a "mere pleading requirement[] but
rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case. "35
"In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is en
titled to have the' court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues." Standing doctrine embraces several judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as
the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's
legal rights, the rule barring adjudieation of generalized griev
ances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.36

Standing has been routinely used within the federal system to ac
complish these and other objectives. 3? The doctrine of standing im
poses a threshold jurisdictional requirement for would-be plaintiffs;
in order to gain access to the court in an administrative dispute, the
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a case or controversy.38
32. Vander Jagt v.O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983)'(Bork, J., con
curring), quoted in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
33. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982).
34. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
35. Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
36. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975».
37. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.4. at
129 (2d ed. 1992). This administrative law hornbook suggests that standing serves sev
eral objectives unrelated to the constitutional rationale. [d. Standing, it is alleged, is
sometimes used by the Supreme Court
(1) to avoid deciding issues it does not want to decide;
(2) to allow it to decide issues it does not want to decide;
(3) to avoid deciding issues that it believes should be decided by other
branches of government;
.
(4) to avoid deciding issues that should be decided by state governments;
(5) to reflect implicitly the subjective values the Court assigns to various con
stitutional and statutory rights;
(6) to limit the ability of judges to become involved in policy disputes that are
governed only by vague constitutional standards; and
(7) to avoid judicial involvement in cases where the plaintiff's claim has little
merit.
[d.
38. Access to the federal courts is generally obtained, as to administrative mat
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A key aspect of the "case or controversy" requirement is a
showing of injury in fact. Economic harm, of course, has long been
acknowledged as sufficient injury in fact. Agency action which di
rectly interferes with a property right or causes diminution in value
would present the type of injury required for standing. 39 But the
United States Supreme Court has not limited standing to those suf
fering economic injury. The Court has also ruled, most notably in
Sierra Club v. Morton,40 that "[a]esthetic and environmental well
being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environ
mental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does
not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judi
cial process."41 Thus, standing may be awarded where the requisite
injury in fact is "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational. "42
Undoubtedly, the high water mark of standing came in United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures .43
The decision, commonly known as SCRAP, has come to serve as
the most notorious example of the expansive federal concept of in
jury in fact. A group of law students successfully claimed standing
by alleging that a general rail rate hike would result in the increased
use of nonrecyclable goods as compared to recyclable goods, caus
ing more refuse to be discarded in the national parks of the Wash
ington, D.C. area, and diminishing their enjoyment of these public
parks.44 The students were ruled to have suffered the requisite aes
thetic and conservational harm for standing to challenge the rate
increase.45
ters, through § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act,S U.S.C. § 702 (1994),
which provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is enti
tled to judicial review thereof." Id.
39. See Federal Communication Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470,476-77 (1940). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1970); Associ
ation of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. ISO, 152 (1970).
40. 405 U.S. 727(1972).
41. Id. at 734.
42. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608,616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), quoted in Camp, 397 U.S. at
154.
43. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
44. See id. at 688-89.
45. Id. at 689-90. The Supreme Court has suggested that SCRAP is limited to its
procedural context, which involved the review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.
R. Cry. P. 12(b)(I). See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45 n.25
(1976). In Simon, the Court hinted that while the complaint in question "withstood a
motion to dismiss, ... it might not have survived challenge on a motion for summary

392

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:385

Since SCRAP, the Supreme Court has systematically imposed
a more stringent view of standing without modifying the Sierra
Club formulation of injury in fact.46 Instead, the Court has de
manded a nexus between the claimed injury and the government
action being challenged. 47 A plaintiff claiming standing in the fed
eral courts must show
the irreducible constitutional minimum of ... three elements.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an in
vasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical[.]'" Second, there must be a causal connection be
tween the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has
to be "fairly tracer able] to the challenged action of the defend
ant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as
opposed to merely ."speculative," that the injury will be "re
dressed by a favorable decision."48

In addition, the Supreme Court has sometimes imposed a fourth
element to assess standing. In Association of Data Processing Ser
vice Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,49 the Court ruled that plaintiffs
must assert an interest that is arguably "within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guaran
tee in question."5o The "zone of interests" test has been interpreted
to require some showing that "the interest asserted by a party in the
particular instance is one intended by Congress to be protected or
regulated by the statute under which suit is brought."51 The test has
gone unmentioned in many Supreme Court decisions on standing. 52
However, in several recent decisions, the Court has revived the
judgment." Id. See also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)
[hereinafter Lujan I]; Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
46. The Court has repeatedly cited the Sierra Club standard with approval. See
Lujan I, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992) ("Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal
species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for [the]
purpose of standing."). See also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,16 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
47. The Court imposed its nexus requirement as early as 1975 in Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
48. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (third, fourth, fifth and sixth alterations in origi
nal) (footnote and citations omitted).
49. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
50. Id. at 153.
51. Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-94 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 881 (1981).
52. The "zone of interests" test was virtually dormant in the period immediately
following Data Processing, inspiring influential Professor Kenneth Culp Davis to sug
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issue. 53
The nexus and redressibility requirements imposed by post
SCRAP decisions, along with the revival of the zone of interests
test, has significantly tightened access to the federal courts, particu
larly when the plaintiff is not the object of the governmental action
at issue. In Lujan II, the Court noted that "[w]hen ... a plaintiff's
asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful reg
ulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else ... standing is not
precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to estab
lish."54 This is due, in the federal context, precisely to the nexus
and redressibility standards. 55 The threshold for injury in fact re
mains quite low; the Court has fashioned the new tests to ensure
that plaintiffs will raise more than the "adjudication of generalized
grievances"56 prohibited by Article III.
B.

The Massachusetts Context

In Massachusetts, the doctrine of standing originates in practi
cal, rather than constitutional, considerations. The Massachusetts
Constitution has no counterpart to Article Ill's Case or Contro
versy Clause. 57 Thus, standing has evolved as a prudential limita
tion, created by the court, to serve a variety of objectives in the
review of administrative decisions.
[W]hether a party is properly before a tribunal to invoke its judi
cial powers affects the good order and efficiency with which the
gest that the Court had abandoned the concept. KENNETH C. DAVIS, AOMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-11, at 509 (1976).
53. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498
U.S. 517 (1991); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
54. Lujan /I, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758
(1984».
55. See id.
56. Id. at 575.
57. However, Part I, Article XXX of the Massachusetts Constitution clearly spells
out the need for separation of powers, and the doctrine of standing does peripherally
promote this goal. Article XXX states:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The exec
utive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them:
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either
of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX.
Under the auspices of Article XXX, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
has refused to decide moot questions or abstract propositions. See, e.g., Caputo v.
Board of Appeals, 330 Mass. 107, 111, 111 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1953) (citation omitted).
See also Razin v. Razin, 332 Mass. 754, 124 N.E.2d 269 (1955).
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matter proceeds .... The multiplicity of parties and the increased
participation by persons whose rights are at best obscure will, in
the absence of exact adherence to requirements as to standing,
seriously erode the efficacy of the administrative process. We do
not say that increased citizen participation is bad. On the con
trary, such interesterisures full review of all issues. However, to
preserve orderly administrative processes and judicial review
thereof, a party must meet the legal requirements necessary to
confer standing. 58 .

In this regard, the doctrine of standing shares the stage with the.
doctrines of mootness,59 ripeness,60 and exhaustion of administra
tive remedies,61 which are all designed to promote the efficient ad
ministration of justice.
Standing is, however, more than a procedural technicality. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has emphasized that the
question of whether a party has standing to participate in ajudicial
review "involves remedial rights affecting the whole of the proceed
ing."62 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts asserted, in Barvenik
v. Board of Aldermen, that standing is "a vital element of all pro
ceedings challenging administrative action."63
In keeping with the federal framework for standing, the
Supreme Judicial Court has insisted upon some injury to set plain
tiffs apart from the general public. In order to gain access to the
court,64 the plaintiff must show harm to a legal right or protected
interest. 65 The Supreme Judicial Court has never embraced the
loose federal test for injury in fact. The legal right or interest cited
by the plaintiff must involve harm to economic or pecuniary
58. Save the Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 366 Mass. 667, 672, 322 N.E.2d
742, 748 (1975).
59. See, e.g., Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare. 367 Mass. 293. 298. 327
N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975).
60. See, e.g., Federman v. Board of Appeals, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 729, 626
N.E.2d 8, 10 (1994).
61. See, e.g., Gordon v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 361 Mass. 582, 587, 281
N.E.2d 573, 577 (1972).
62. Save the Bay, 366 Mass. at 672, 322 N.E.2d at 748 (1975).
63. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 n.lO, 597 N.E.2d
48,52 n.10 (1992).
64. Access to the court for the review of administrative decisions by agencies of
the Commonwealth is generally available pursuant to MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30A, § 14
(1994), which provides in pertinent part: "Any person ... aggrieved by a final decision
of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding, whether such decision is affirmative or
negative in form, shall be entitled to a judicial review thereof ...." Id.
65. Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86
N.E.2d 920, 922 (1949).
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concerns. 66
One commentator has suggested that "[t]here appears to be no
Massachusetts standing to secure judicial review of administrative
agency decision where the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized
and accorded standing where any merely non-economic injury was
at issue."67 Sierra Club, with its recognition of "aesthetic and envi
ronmental well-being" as sufficient injury for standing,68 has no
counterpart in Massachusetts. Apparently, the Supreme Judicial
Court does not intend to allow SCRAP to creep into Massachusetts
case law; standing turns on economic or pecuniary harm. 69
The Supreme Judicial Court has also imposed a local version of
the "zone of interests" test in assessing standing disputes. In Mas
sachusetts Association of Independent Insurance Agents and Bro
kers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance,7o the court ruled that
injury alone was not enough: "A party has standing when it can
allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute or regula
tory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred."71 The
reliance on Data Processing is obvious.72 The Supreme Judicial
Court has routinely ruled that injuries attributable to business com
petition are outside the zone of interests of various statutes.73
It is worth noting that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts has not adopted the nexus and redressibility prongs of the
federal test for standing. In effect, the Massachusetts concept
seems frozen in time before the Data Processing era of the federal
66. See Group Ins. Comm'n v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 381 Mass. 199,207,408
N.E.2d 851, 857 (1980); Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 295, 367 N.E.2d 796, 800-01 (1977); South Shore
Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 351 Mass. 363,367,220 N.E.2d 899, 901-02
(1966). See generally Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. State Rac
ing Comm'n, 342 Mass. 694, 175 N.E.2d 244 (1961).
67. 40 ALEXANDER J. CELLA, MASSACHUSEITS PRAcncr SERIES § 1675, at 229
n.S (1986).
68. See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
69. Professor Cella has referred to the Supreme Judicial Court's reluctance to
expand its concept of injury in fact as "cramped, constructed [sic], and niggardly" and
has chided the court for its failure to "offer a full and complete explanation" for the
difference with the federal doctrine. 40 CELLA, supra note 67, § 1675 at 230.
70. 373 Mass. 290, 367 N.E.2d 796 (1977).
71. Id. at 293, 367 N.E.2d at 799.
72. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Data
Processing.
73. See Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 371 N.E.2d 728
(1977); Everett Town Taxi, Inc. v. Board of Aldermen, 366 Mass. 534, 320 N.E.2d 896
(1974) (discussing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268A); Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of
Appeal, 324 Mass. 427,429-30,86 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1949) (discussing Zoning Enabling
Act).
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doctrine. Injury in fact is economic or pecuniary in nature;74 this
harsh standard for access negates the need for the nexus and
redressibility tests developed by the United States Supreme Court.
The zone of interests test operates, as it does in the federal system,
to provide an additional, if infrequent, barrier to access.
II.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF STANDING

Barvenik and its progeny are also controversial because of
their pronouncements regarding the evidentiary burdens associated
with establishing or challenging standing at various stages of litiga
tion. 75 Simply put, more is expected of a party claiming standing at
a summary judgment hearing than at a proceeding under Rule 12;
more again is expected at the trial stage than at the pretrial stage.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that when standing
is contested, "each element must be supported in the same way as
any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the succes
sive stages of the litigation. "76 The Barvenik line is better under
stood after a closer look at the devices by which standing may be
contested.

A.

Some General Considerations

The doctrine of standing has both a prudential and a constitu
tional function in litigation. The prudential component ensures the
efficient administration of justice; the constitutional component
promotes the separation of powers called for by Article III (at the
federal level) and by Article XXX (of the Massachusetts Constitu
tion). The doctrine's importance is reflected in the procedural flexi
bility attached to it by the federal and Massachusetts courts.
Initially, the trial courts are "obligated to determine that
[plaintiffs have] adequate standing to present their . . . chal
lenges."77 The court may not rely on mere technical compliance
offered by the parties. "Bald assertions, or concessions, of counsel
[will] not suffice. Standing is a mixed question of fact and law. To
the extent that it is a question of fact, the court must find the facts
74. Even Data Processing contains dictum to the effect that aesthetic, conserva
tional, and recreational injury would suffice for standing. Association of Data Process
ing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
75. As to the controversy, see Halley, supra note 13, at B3.
76. Lujan 1/, 504 U.S. 555,561 (1992).
77. Church of Scientology Flag Servo Org., Inc. V. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d
598,607 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116 (1986).
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and recite them in a fashion that will accommodate appellate re
view."78 Consequently, the trial court has the power to dismiss the
matter, upon motion, for lack of standing. 79 Even where standing is
stipulated by counsel,80 or where no objection to standing is
raised,81 the trial court may accomplish this result sua sponte. 82
The appellate level shares in this responsibility to police the
court system, and has powers similar to those of the trial court. The
United States Supreme Court stated in FWIPBS, Inc. v. City of Dal
las 83 that
every federal appellate court has a special obligation to "satisfy
itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower
courts in a cause under review," even though the parties are pre
pared to concede it. "And if the record discloses that the lower
court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect,
although the parties make no contention concerning it."84

The parties, too, have clearly delineated roles. The party
claiming standing bears the burden of proof when the issue is con
tested. 85 "[S]tanding cannot be 'inferred argumentatively from
averments in the pleadings,' but rather 'must affirmatively appear
in the record. "'86 The party opposing standing has an opportunity
78. Id. (footnote omitted).
79. See Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 881 (1990) (regarding a motion for summary judg
ment); Trustees of Worcester State Hosp. v. Governor, 395 Mass. 377, 380,480 N.E.2d
291,293 (1985) (regarding a motion to dismiss); Doe v. Governor, 381 Mass. 702, 704,
412 N.E.2d 325, 326-27 (1980) (same).
80. Church of Scientology, 777 F.2d at 606.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., National Union of Hosp. and Health Care Employees v. Carey, 557
F.2d 278,280-81 (2d Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Illinois Sporting Goods Ass'n
v. County of Cook, 884 F. Supp. 275, 282 (N.D. III. 1995); Borkowski v. Fraternal Order
of Police, 155 F.R.D. 105, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
83. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
84. Id. at 231 (quoting Bunder v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541
(1986» (citations omitted). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has endorsed
this position. See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 412 Mass.
243, 248, 588 N.E.2d 639, 642 (1992) ("Standing to raise an issue ... that involves
subject matter jurisdiction ... may be raised ... by an appellate court on its own
motion.") (citations omitted). Cf. Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707,709,470
N.E.2d 398, 399 (1984) ("A trial judge's findings concerning whether a person is ag
grieved should not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.") (citing MASS. R.
Ov. P. 52(a»; Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 217, 326
N.E.2d 348,353 (1975).
85. Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). See also FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 231; Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
86. FWIPBS,493 U.S. at 231 (citations omitted).
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to raise the issue at any time during the proceedings. 87 A challenge
to standing can even be raised by a party for the first time at the
appellate leve1. 88
With these practical considerations in mind, the federal and
Massachusetts courts, in assessing standing, have routinely stated
what the evidentiary expectations of the plaintiff are at various
stages of the litigation. In order to add perspective to Barvenik and
its progeny, a detailed review of these devices is in order.
B.

Rule 12(b)

Rule 12(b)89 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure
states, in relevant part, that "[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a
claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the respon
sive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1)
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; ... (6) Failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted."90
In Lujan II, the United States Supreme Court summarized the
plaintiff's evidentiary obligations at this stage of the proceedings by
stating that "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of
injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a
motion to dismiss we 'presum[e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim."'91
"When a defendant challenges standing via a motion to dismiss,
'both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in
favor of the complaining party."'92
87. See, e.g., Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1484
(10th Cir. 1995); Board of County Comm'rs v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (10th
Cir. 1993); Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 131 n.6. 597 N.E.2d
48, 50 n.6 (1992).
88. Prudential-Bache, 412 Mass. at 248. 588 N.E.2d at 642. The court noted that
"a party may not argue for the first time on appeal that an opponent lacks standing to
raise a constitutional issue that was presented below without any objection to the
party's standing." Id. (citing Aronson v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass. 244, 247, 516
N.E.2d 137, 139 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988». This, apparently, is one of
the few limitations in raising the issue of standing.
89. MASS. R. CIv. P. 12(b). For purposes of this discussion, reference to Rule
12(b) shall be deemed reference to the identical federal and state rules.
90. Id.
91. Lujan ll, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Lujan 1,497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990».
Lujan I is an equally important decision in the genre of standing.
92. Sanner v. Board of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin,422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975».
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois had a recent opportunity to explain the general standards
governing a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss:
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)[] does not test
whether the plaintiff will prevail on the merits but instead
whether the claimant has properly stated a claim. . .. The court
must accept as true all well-plead factual allegations and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. However, the
court need not strain to find favorable inferences which are not
apparent on the face of the complaint. Similarly, the court is not
required to accept legal conclusions either alleged or inferred
from pleaded facts. Finally, the complaint need not specify the
correct legal theory nor point to the right statute to survive a
Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, provided that "relief is possible
under any set of facts that could be established consistent with
the allegations." The complaint must, however, state either di
rect or inferential allegations concerning all material elements
necessary for recovery under the chosen legal theory.93 .

These standards apply whether a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).94
Notwithstanding the similarities between motions to dismiss
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), there are considerable dif
ferences between them, the chief of which is explained within Rule
12(b):
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for

failure of the pleading to state a claini upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 95

In essence, the submittal of affidavits and other matters outside the
pleadings converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.96 Without such submittals, the general standards appli
93. PAC for Middle Am. v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 95 C P>27, 1995 WL 571887,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22,1995) (citations omitted) (quoting Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G.,
953 F.2d 1073,1078 (7th Cir. 1992». For an example of the Massachusetts statement of
this standard, see Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96,98, 360 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1977).
94. Sanner, 62 F.3d at 923-25.
95. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b).
96. For a wealth of decisions addressing the issue of standing pursuant to a mo
tion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), see Humane Soc'y v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338, 345-46
(Q. Int'l Trade 1995), and the cases cited therein.
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cable to Rule 12(b) motions remain in force.
On the other hand, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is not converted
into a motion for summary judgment by the submittal of extra
pleading materials.97 One of the important distinctions between a
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and a dismissal pursuant to
12(b)(6) is that under 12(b)(1) "the court is not restricted to the
face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affida
vits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the exist
ence of jurisdiction to hear the action."98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
recently explained the district court's procedural requirements
under a Rule 12(b)(1) illotion:
[T]he district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity for dis
covery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the
motion to dismiss. Thus, some courts have refused to grant such
a motion before a plaintiff has had a chance to discover the facts
necessary to establish jurisdiction. Other courts have refused to
uphold such a motion where-absent an incurable defect in the
complaint-the plaintiff has had no opportunity to be heard on
the factual matters underlying jurisdiction. And, although [Rule]
43(e) allows factual motions to be heard on the basis of affidavits
alone, a judge may be required to hear oral testimony where the
facts are complicated and testimony would be helpful. . .. Inso
far as the defendant's motion to dismiss raises factual issues, the
plaintiff should have an opportunity to develop and argue the
facts in a manner that is adequate in the context of the disputed
issues and evidence.99

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has taken the same
basic view of Rule 12(b)(l) motions.1°O
C.

Rule 56

Rule 56(c)101 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure
97. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
98. 2A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE <J[ 12.07 [2.-1], at 12-49
to 12-50 (2d ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
99. Williamson v. Thcker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981) (citations and footnote omitted).
100. See Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 37 Mass.
App. Ct. 657, 642 N.E.2d 599 (1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 421 Mass. 106,653
N.E.2d 589 (1995). The decision is discussed in greater detail in part V, infra.
101. MASS. R. CIv. P. 56(c). For purposes of this discussion, reference to Rule
56(c) and (e) shall be deemed a reference to both the federal and state rules, which
have only slight differences in style.
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states, in relevant part, that a party is entitled to summary judgment
in his or her favor if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."l02 Rule 56(e) provides that:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth spe
cific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.103

In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (Lujan 1),104 the
United States Supreme Court explained its expectations under Rule
56:
"[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of sum
mary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon mo
tion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Where no such showing is made, "[t]he moving party is
'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmov
ing party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of
proof."10S

Furthermore, it is
clear that Rule 56 does not require the moving party to negate
the elements of the nonmoving party's case; to the contrary, "re
102. Id. The federal counterpart shares the same language. See FED. R. CIv. P.
56(c).
103. MASS. R. CIv. P. 56(e). The federal rule differs only slightly. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e) provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
Id.
104. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
105. Id. at 884 (citations omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986».

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

402

[Vol. 18:385

gardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary .
judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be
granted so long as whatever is before the district court demon
strates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as
set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."106

The Massachusetts Appeals Court endorsed the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Lujan II, when it emphasized the evi
dentiary burden on the plaintiff to come forward with evidence re
garding standing. 107 "In response to a summary judgment motion
... the plaintiff can no longer rest on such 'mere allegations,' but
must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts,' which
for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be
true."108 When affidavits accompany the motion, the court is free
to scrutinize these submittals to ensure that each and every element
of standing is proven. 109 Thus, in both Lujan decisions, the
Supreme Court rejected standing for the plaintiffs because their af
fidavits contained no facts showing the imminent required injury.11o
These standards with regard to summary judgment are consistent
with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of
Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 111
D. Post-pleadings
When the issue of standing is contested after the pleading
stage, the party asserting standing has the burden of proof. The
United States Supreme Court has noted that "at the final stage,
[this claim] (if controverted) must be 'supported adequately by the
evidence adduced at trial."'112 Generally, in civil matters, the party
106. Id. at 885 (quoting Ce/otex, 477 U.S. at 323).
Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992), quoted in Barvenik v. Board of Alder
men, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132 n.9, 597 N.E.2d 48, 51 n.9 (1992).
108. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted).
109. See, e.g., Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 888. In Lujan I, the Court concluded that "[i]n
ruling upon a Rule 56 motion, 'a District Court must resolve any factual issues of con
troversy in favor of the non-moving party' only in the sense that, where the facts specifi
cally averred by that party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the
motion must be denied." Id. In a standing contest, the plaintiff bears the burden of
alleging specific facts to demonstrate injury: "The object of this provision is not to re
place the conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations
of an affidavit." Id.
110. Id. at 885-89; Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 563-64.
111. See Town of Norwood v. Adams-Russell Co., 401 Mass. 677,680,519 N.E.2d
253,255 (1988); Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 370-71, 436 N.E.2d 139, 142-43,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982).
112. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bell
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979».
107.
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with the burden of proof "must persuade the fact finder that its
contention is more probably true than false."113 This is the classic
formulation of the "preponderance of the evidence standard."114
E.

Conclusion

Taken together, these procedural devices make it clear that the
issue of standing may be raised at any point in the proceedings.
The burden of persuasion operates on a sliding scale, moreforgiv
ing at the early stages, more stringent at trial. Thus, even where the
trial court has made a Rule 12 or Rule 56 determination of stand
ing, the issue may be reassessed at the trial stage.l 15 Plaintiffs main
tain a continuing obligation to demonstrate their requisite stake in
the outcome. Failure to prove standing may result, even at the ap
pellate stage, in dismissal of the action.
III.

PRE-BARVENIK STANDING UNDER THE ZONING

Acr

In zoning, adjudicatory decisions are made by administrative
agencies. Thus, the standing of the plaintiff to contest a decision is
113. HON. PAUL J. LIACOS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE
§ 5.2.1, at 198 (6th ed. 1994).

114. Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 250, 29 N.E.2d 825,
827 (1940).
After the evidence has been weighed, that proposition is proved by a prepon
derance of the evidence if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the
sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the
mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger
there.
[d.
In Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132 n.8, 597 N.E.2d 48,
51 n.8 (1992), Justice Laurence raised the issue of the proper burden of persuasion in a
standing contest. He noted that "[n]o case has clearly articulated the measure of the
plaintiffs' burden in proving the requisite aggrievement." [d. He went on to suggest,
without so holding, that the preponderance of the evidence standard might be appropri
ate. [d.
It is likely that the preponderance of the evidence standard suffices in this regard.
The alternative "clear and convincing evidence" standard has been imposed primarily
in other contexts. See LIACOS ET AL., supra note 113, §§ 5.2.2-.2.6 at 200-06. If a trial
court decision is appealed, the reviewing court is limited to the evidence in the trial
court record. Since the courts have not articulated a standard with regard to the quan
tum of evidence required to survive a post-trial standing challenge, it is unclear what
the measure would be. Because the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and because
a reviewing court may address the issue of standing sua sponte, a plaintiff may be un
able to meet the burden, regardless of the quantum of proof required, if the issue is
addressed for the first time at the appellate level.
115. Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 689, 642 N.E.2d
314, 316 (1994), review denied, 419 Mass. 1106, 646 N.E.2d 1070 (1995); Jaffe v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 931, 612 N.E.2d 693,695 (1993).
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a relevant consideration. As far back as the 1933 codification of the
Zoning Enabling Act,116 only "persons aggrieved" have been per
mitted to maintain an action in the appropriate courts.
The first decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
to explore the nuances of the "person aggrieved" requirement was
Circle Lounge &' Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal,l17 The Supreme
Judicial Court fashioned a two-part approach to the question of
standing. First, a person aggrieved must be "one whose legal rights
have been infringed."118 In essence, the party claiming standing
must show some special injury. The appeals court stated this test
more succinctly in Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning
Board: 119 "Individual or corporate property owners acquire stand
ing by asserting a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private
right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest."120 As
a general principle, pre- Barvenik decisions honored the warning
that "[t]he words 'person aggrieved' ... are not to be narrowly
construed."121
116. See 1933 MASS. Acrs 269, § 1.
117. 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 N.E.2d 920, 921-22 (1949). An earlier decision, God
frey v. Building Comm'r, 263 Mass. 589, 590, 161 N.E. 819,820 (1928), reviewed stand
ing to challenge a Boston rezoning.
118. Circle Lounge, 324 Mass. at 430, 86 N.E.2d at 922.
119. 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 540 N.E.2d 182, review denied, 405 Mass. 1204, 542
N.E.2d 602 (1989).
120. Id. at 492-93, 540 N.E.2d at 184.
121. Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336 Mass. 199,204,143 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1957).
As a reflection of its liberal interpretation of "person aggrieved" status, the Massachu
setts Appeals Court has held that tenants are not barred, per se, from claiming standing.
Quimby v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 19 Mass. App. a. 1005.1006.476 N.E.2d 241, 242
(1985). The parallel standing provision of the Subdivision Control Law. MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 41, § 81BB (1994), has been interpreted to allow mortgagees and purchasers with
equitable interests to claim standing. Carey v. Planning Bd., 335 Mass. 740, 743, 139
N.E.2d 920,922-23 (1957).
On the other hand, the court has proposed several rules to limit standing. Parties
claiming injury in fact may be restricted by the linear limitation intimated in Boston
Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 63 n.17, 371 N.E.2d 728, 746 n.17
(1977) (the court expressed "grave doubts about granting standing to any person whose
property interest is approximately 1800 feet ... away from the site" in issue). The court
has been consistently hostile to standing for corporations without a demonstration of
some harm to corporate legal rights. An unincorporated association cannot gain stand
ing to be a party to a lawsuit. Harvard Square Defense Fund, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 496
n.9, 540 N.E.2d at 186 n.9. Several cases have involved ad hoc "citizens groups" seeking
standing to challenge permit decisions. See, e.g., id. at 496, 540 N.E.2d at 185-86; Chon
gris v. Board of Appeals, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 999, 999, 459 N.E.2d 1245, 1246 (1984);
Amherst Growth Study Comm., Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 827,
296 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1973). "[A] statement of organizational purpose cannot clothe a
civic association with aggrieved person status." Chongris, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 999, 459
N.E.2d at 1247. The organization must locate individual plaintiffs with aggrieved per
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The second prong of the standing test requires an analysis of
the "peculiar legal rights ... intended to be given to the plaintiff by
the statute permitting an appeal."122 Few decisions tum on this sec
ond prong, but several cases hold that the prevention of injury from
business competition is not within the purposes of the Zoning
ACt. 123 Similarly, the court has held that the Zoning Act does not
protect "a proprietor in a less restricted zone ... [from] the intro
duction into a more restricted zone of any use permitted in the zone
in which the proprietor's property is located."124 The court has
taken an ad hoc approach to other c1aims.125 This inquiry is roughly
equivalent to the "zone of interest" test, announced by the United
States Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Or
ganizations v. Camp .126
son status to carry the ball. Harvard Square Defense Fund, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 496,
540 N.E.2d at 186. It is not necessary for the judge to. detennine· that all of the named
plaintiffs have standing, as long as one of the plaintiffs qualifies. Murray v. Board of
Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476 n.7, 494 N.E.2d 1364, 1367 n.7 (1986).
While the phrase "person aggrieved" will not be narrowly construed, "[i]t [is] not
enough [to] have ... a general civic interest in the enforcement of the zoning ordi
nance." Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 218, 326 N.E.2d 348,
353 (1975) (citing Amherst Growth Study Comm., 1 Mass. App. Ct. at 827, 296 N.E.2d
at 718). See also Green v. Board of Appeals, 404 Mass. 571, 574, 536 N.E.2d 584, 586
(1989) (reaching the same result for an individual seeking to enforce the ordinance or
by-law).
122. Circle Lounge, 324 Mass. at 431, 86 N.E.2d at 923.
123. Id. at 429-30, 86 N.E.2d at 922; Sherrill House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19
Mass. App. Ct. 274, 276-77, 473 N.E.2d 716, 717-18, review denied, 394 Mass. 1103,477
N.E.2d 595 (1985); Redstone v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 385, 416
N.E.2d 543,544 (1981); Waltham Motor Inn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 217, 326 N.E.2d at 353.
124. Circle Lounge, 324 Mass. at 432, 86 N.E.2d at 923. The plaintiff, located in a
business district, objected to a variance granted to construct a restaurant on nearby
residentially-zoned property. The restaurant would have been allowed in the business
district. The court stated that:·
The residence zone ... was established to protect that zone against business
and manufacturing uses. It was not established to protect the plaintiff's restau
rant, which is located in a business zone. The residence zone was designed to
protect residence against business. It was not designed to protect business
against business. Therefore it would be an anomaly to confer upon the plain
tiff peculiar legal rights against a business of a kind pennitted in the zone
where its property is.
Id.
125. See Reeves v. Board of Zoning Appeal, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1011, 1012, 455
N.E.2d 447,449 (1983) (holding that possible future injury under a Cambridge rent
control ordinance does not render plaintiff a person "aggrieved" under the Zoning
Act).
126. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Camp holds that if the interest the plaintiff seeks
to protect is "arguably within the zone of interests" that Congress intended to protect
or regulate by the relevant statute, then the plaintiff is an appropriate person to com
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The key inquiry is the claimed injury.127 In the absence of any
specific evidence on the question, the court has relied on two rules
of reason. "Parties in interest," as set forth in Massachusetts Gen
eral Laws, chapter 40A, section 11, enjoy a presumption of stand
ing. 128 The statute defines a "party in interest" as "the petitioner,
abutters, owners of land directly opposite on any public or private
street or way, and abutters to the abutters within three hundred feet
of the property line of the petitioner as they appear on the most
recent applicable tax list."129 Additionally, a nearby owner of prop
erty lying in the same or in a substantially similar type of zoning
district enjoys a similar presumption of injury when seeking to up
hold the character of the district. 130
Where a presumption exists, it must be placed in its proper
perspective. "If the issue is contested, and any additional evidence
is offered, the point of jurisdiction will be determined on all the
evidence with no benefit to the plaintiffs from the presumption as
SUCh."131 The court has stated that the presumption "recedes if the
issue is contested."132 When this occurs, the burden of proof is on
the party claiming standing. 133 In general, "[a] trial judge's findings
of aggrieved person status are entitled to deference."l34
The survey which follows is not intended to be a comprehen
plain of the injury and has standing. Id. at 153. See supra part I discussing the Camp
decision.
127. A claim of injury is not forfeited by an aggrieved person who negotiates with
the petitioner for a maximum price of her nearby property. Bedford v. Trustees of
Boston Univ., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 372,377-78,518 N.E.2d 874,877 (1988).
128. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4OA, § 11 (1994). See Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336
Mass. 199, 204, 143 N.E.2d 270, 273 (1957); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass.
App. Ct. 55, 58, 596 N.E.2d 369,371 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 415 Mass. 329, 613
N.E.2d 893 (1993); Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App.
Ct. 491, 495, 540 N.E.2d 182, 185-86, review denied, 405 Mass. 1204, 542 N.E.2d 602
(1989); Murray v. Board of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. O. 473, 476, 494 N.E.2d 1364, 1366
(1986); Gordon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 347, 494 N.E.2d 14,
17, review denied, 398 Mass. 1103,497 N.E.2d 1096 (1986); Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass.
App. O. 707, 709, 470 N.E.2d 398, 399 (1984); Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3
Mass. App. Ct. 210, 214, 326 N.E.2d 348, 352 (1975).
129. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 11 (1994).
130. Waltham Motor Inn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 214-15, 326 N.E.2d at 352. See also
Vainas v. Board of Appeals, 337 Mass. 591, 594, 150 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1958); Reynolds v.
Board of Appeal, 335 Mass. 464,469-70,140 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1957).
131. Marotta, 336 Mass. at 204, 143 N.E.2d at 274.
132. Redstone v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 385, 416 N.E.2d 543,
544 (1981). See also Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. O. at 58, 596 N.E.2d at 371.
133. Sherrill House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 274, 276, 473
N.E.2d 716, 717, review denied, 394 Mass. 1103,477 N.E.2d 595 (1985).
134. Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 59,596 N.E.2d at 372. See also Paulding v.
Bruins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707,709,470 N.E.2d 398, 399 (1984).
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sive summary of all zoning and standing cases in the years between
Circle Lounge and Barvenik. Some cases mention the issues with
out discussion.1 35 Others end up in a remand.13 6 Readers versed in
zoning law will undoubtedly agree that the major decisions have
been included.

A.

Parties in Interest .

Those contests involving parties in interest reported from the
pre-Barvenik era yielded fairly predictable results. Parties in inter
est were generally vindicated by the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
In ten of the fourteen reported cases, "aggrieved person" status was
accorded.
In most of the favorable decisions, standing was awarded be
cause the proposed development had a direct impact on a protected
right or interest. 137 In others, it is unclear whether the party in in
terest was awarded standing because of direct harm or because they
sought to preserve the integrity of their residential zoning dis
trictS.138 In several of these decisions, the court evaluated the plain
tiffs' standing despite the defendants' failure to present sufficient
evidence, or in several cases any evidence, contesting the issue.139
This would, of course, leave the presumption of the plaintiffs' stand
ing in place. In eight of these ten decisions, standing was upheld
135. See, e.g., Walker v. Board of Appeals, 388 Mass. 42, 445 N.E.2d 141 (1983).
136. See, e.g., Quimby v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 1005, 476
N.E.2d 241 (1985).
137. See Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 58-59, 596 N.E.2d at 371 (interference
with water views and loss of value); Cummings v. City Council, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 345,
350,551 N.E.2d 46, 50 (holding that plaintiff might be able to prove "tangible harm"),
review denied, 407 Mass. 1102,554 N.E.2d 851 (1990); Bedford v. Trustees of Boston
Univ., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 377, 518 N.E.2d 874, 877 (1988) (proposed construction of
building would lead to traffic and parking problems and would create shadows);
Gordon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 347, 494 N.E.2d 14, 17-18
(holding that proposed development shares right of way with plaintiff and will be
cleared), review denied, 398 Mass. 1103, 497 N.E.2d 1096 (1986); Paulding, 18 Mass.
App. Ct. at 709, 470 N.E.2d at 399 (erosion, flooding, tree damage); Butts v. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 249, 253, 464 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1984) (complete destruc
tion of water view).
138. See Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336 Mass. 199,203-05, 143 N.E.2d 270,
273-74 (1957); Murray v. Board of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473,476,494 N.E.2d
1364, 1366-67 (1986); Owens v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 995, 418
N.E.2d 635, 637 (1981); Rafferty v. Sancta Maria Hosp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 629-30,
367 N.E.2d 856, 859-60 (1977).
139. Murray,22 Mass. App. Ct. at 476, 494 N.E.2d at 1367; Butts, 18 Mass. App.
Ct. at 253, 464 N.E.2d at 112; Owens, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 995, 418 N.E.2d at 637;
Rafferty,5 Mass. App. Ct. at 629-30, 367 N.E.2d at 859-60.
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after trial. 140 ;Of the two remaining decisions, one was before the
Massachusetts Appeals Court after the granting of a motion to dis
miss141 and the procedural status of the other case 142 is neither com
mon nor likely to be repeated.
There were four reported decisions in which parties in interest
were not granted standing. 143 Three of these decisions involved cir
cumstances in which the court reasonably concluded that the nature
of the injury had more to do with business competition than a pro
tected right or interest. l44 The other, Baxter v. Board ofAppeais,145
is instructive. The special permit under attack authorized six dwell
ing units. The plaintiffs' claims were summarized by the court:
[F]irst, that the locus, although long filled in, had once been sub
ject to tidal action; was, therefore, tideland; and that a license
had not been obtained for revised use, conformably with G.L. c.
91, § 18.... A second concern, on the part of one of the plain
tiffs, was about fish smells from a proposed fish store on the lo
cus, but a fish store was permissible as a matter of right . . . .
Other concerns of the plaintiffs fell in the category of planning
opinions, e.g., "Well I don't like the way it's laid out over there
and it shouldn't be, I don't think," and, "[w]ell, cutting out the
140. Marotta, 336 Mass. at 205,143 N.E.2d at 274; Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct.
at 58-59, 596 N.E.2d at 371-72; Bedford, 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 376-77, 518 N.E.2d at 877;
Murray, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 476, 494 N.E.2d at 1366-67; Gordon, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at
347,494 N.E.2d at 17-18; Paulding, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 709, 470 N.E.2d at 399; Owens,
11 Mass. App. Ct. at 995, 418 N.E.2d at 637; Rafferty, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 629-30, 367
N.E.2d at 859-60.
141. Cummings, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 349-50, 551 N.E.2d at 49.
142. Butts, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 250, 464 N.E.2d at 110 ("The history of the litiga
tion is lengthy and complicated procedurally.").
143. Baxter v. Board of Appeals, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 993, 994-95, 562 N.E.2d 841.
842 (1990); Sherrill House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 274,276-77,473
N.E.2d 716, 717-18, review denied, 394 Mass. 1103,477 N.E.2d 595 (1985); Redstone v.
Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 384, 416 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1981); Waltham
Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 217, 326 N.E.2d 348, 353 (1975).
144. Sherrill House, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 276-77, 473 N.E.2d at 717-18 (noncon
fonning nursing horne in residential district without standing to defend district's integ
rity); Redstone, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 384, 416 N.E.2d at 543 (competing bank appeals
award of variance to another bank across street; property "could barely be seen" from
plaintiff's land); Waltham Moto;'Inn, 3.Mass. App. Ct. at 217, 326 N.E.2d at 353 (com
peting motel operators challenge special pennit for hotel).
145. 29 Mass. App. Ct. 993,562 N.E.2d 841 (1990). The court was not comforta
ble with the description of the plaintiffs as "aggrieved persons" because there was "con
siderable obscurity" in the records as to their receipt of statutory notice. Id. at 994, 562
N.E.2d at 842. Nonetheless, the court did acknowledge the rebuttable presumption on
the plaintiffs' behalf. Id.
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views of other people in the park ... " and "[s]houldn't be so
dense. "146

The lower court ruled, after trial, that these claims were insufficient.
The appeals court agreed.
B. Legitimate Interest in Preserving the Integrity of the District

A second presumption of standing exists for those persons with
a "legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the district,"147
whether or not they suffer a distinct injury.148 The presumption is
available only to plaintiffs who reside in the same district as the
project they oppose.1 49 In the years since its origin, only four re
ported decisions have turned exclusively on this presumption. 1so In
all of the decisions, the plaintiffs were awarded standing. lSI
C.

No Presumption

In all five reported decisions falling chronologically between
Circle Lounge and Barvenik, plaintiffs who were without the bene
fit of either presumption were denied standing. lS2 In four of these
decisions, plaintiffs were, or were part of, ad hoc citizen associations
seeking zoning enforcement. lS3 In the fifth decision, Green v.
146. Id. at 994-95, 562 N.E.2d at 842. Any practitioner active in the representa
tion of abutters will recognize these remarks.
147. Murray v. Board of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476, 494 N.E.2d 1364,
1367 (1986).
148. Id.; Owens v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 995, 418 N.E.2d 635,
637 (1981); Rafferty v. Sancta Maria Hosp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 629-30, 367 N.E.2d
856, 860 (1977).
149. Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491,
495,540 N.E.2d 182, 186, review denied, 405 Mass. 1204,542 N.E.2d 602 (1989).
150. But see supra note 138.
151. See Smith v. Board of Appeals, 340 Mass. 230, 231-32, 163 N.E.2d 654, 656
(1960); Vainas v. Board of Appeals, 337 Mass. 591, 594, 150 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1958);
Colabufalo v. Board of Appeal, 336 Mass. 213, 217, 143 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1957). The
presumption originated in Reynolds v. Board of Appeals, 335 Mass. 464, 470, 140
N.E.2d 491, 496 (1957) ("[P]laintiffs ... are entitled to assert their interest in having the
. . . district in which they own real estate and reside maintained as [a residential
· . ] . . .. ") .
d lstnct
152. This figure includes neither Circle Lounge itself, nor Godfrey v. Building
Comm'r, 263 Mass. 589, 593, 161 N.E. 819, 821 (1928), a fairly ancient case. One is
tempted to add to this figure the original plaintiffs dismissed from the action in Rafferty.
See Rafferty, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 625-26,367 N.E.2d at 857.
153. See Harvard Square Defense Fund, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 493-94,540 N.E.2d
at 185; Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 999,459 N.E.2d 1245 (1984);
Owens v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 994,418 N.E.2d 635 (1981) (several
plaintiffs have no presumption and are dismissed; one abutter is allowed to proceed);
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Board of Appeals,lS4 a single plaintiff sought enforcement of a zon
ing by-law. Clearly, the "party in interest" and "integrity of the
district" presumptions were critical to the issue of standing during
this time frame.

D.

Conclusion

Standing in the pre-Barvenik era appears quite predictable. Of
the eighteen situations reviewed by the court in which plaintiffs en
joyed the benefit of a presumption, fourteen resulted in decisions
upholding standing. In two of the four cases in which presumptive
standing was rebutted and standing denied, the plaintiffs were busi
ness competitors of the defendant permittee; in another, the plain
tiff operated a nonconforming use in a residential district. On the
other hand, in all of the reported decisions in which plaintiffs were
without presumptive standing, the court determined that the matter
should be dismissed. .
A closer look reveals a few surprising considerations. First, in
all seven decisions in which plaintiffs sought to uphold the integrity
of the district in which they resided, they were successful; this was
true whether they were parties in interest (three cases) or more re
motely situated neighbors (four cases). In each case, the district in
question was residentially zoned. The court gave great leeway to
those within the same district seeking to maintain its character.
Second, in many of the presumptive standing decisions involv
ing injury in fact, the defendants simply failed to submit enough
evidence to rebut the presumption. ISS In Paulding v. Bruins 1S6 and
Butts v. Zoning Board of Appeals, IS7 the court did not comment on
the defendants' evidence at all, asserting only that the plaintiffs had
met their evidentiary burden. In Baxter v. Board of Appeals, the
anomaly of the pre-Barvenik era, it was not the strength of the de
fendant's evidence as much as the plaintiffs' weak showing that car
ried the day. ISS Only Bedford v. Trustees of Boston University,lS9 of
Amherst Growth Study Comm., Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 826-27,
296 N.E.2d 717, 717-18 (1973).
154. 404 Mass. 571, 536 N.E.2d 584 (1989).
155. See Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 596 N.E.2d 369
(1992), affd in relevant part, 415 Mass. 329, 613 N.E.2d 893 (1993); Murray v. Board of
Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 494 N.E.2d 1364 (1986).
156. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707,470 N.E.2d 398 (1984).
157. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 249,464 N.E.2d 108 (1984).
158. See Baxter v. Board of Appeals, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 993, 562 N.E.2d 841
(1980).
159. 25 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 518 N.E.2d 874 (1988).
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the cases involving injury in fact, was a true contest- ,
Third, notwithstanding the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's strict view, some of the appeals court decisions hint at a
softening of the rule requiring economic or pecuniary harm. Not
every party in interest claimed economic or pecuniary injury. For
example, the plaintiff in Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals 160 claimed
loss of view, as did the plaintiff in ButtS. 161 The plaintiffs in Paul
ding cited "fears of erosion, flooding, and damage to the trees on
their 10t."162 These claims are reminiscent of the "aesthetic, recrea
tional or conservational" injury endorsed by the United States
Supreme Court in Sierra Club, but roundly rejected by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in its standing decisions. 163
These SCRAP-like intrusions into the case law occur without
elaboration by the appeals court. Was the 'appeals court con
sciously endorsing noneconomic harm as grounds for standing in a
zoning dispute? Or were these simply instances in which the de
fendants' evidentiary presentations opened the door for plaintiffs?
The latter position has more support in a close reading of the cases.
This is confirmed in Barvenik, which makes it clear that the more
expansive federal view of standing has no place in the Common
wealth. 164
IV.

BARVENIK AND ITS PROGENY

In a series of cases commencing with Barvenik v. Board of Al
dermen, the Massachusetts Appeals Court fundamentally altered
forty-three years of practice and procedure. 165 Barvenik makes two
160. 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 58-59, 596 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1992), rev'd, 415 Mass. 329,
613 N.E.2d 893 (1993).
161. See Butts, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 253, 464 N.E.2d at 112. In Tsagronis, the
plaintiff offered uncontroverted opinion that the loss of view would diminish the value
of his land. Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 58, 596 N.E.2d at 371. In Butts, the loss of
water view was total. Butts, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 253,464 N.E.2d at 112.
162. Paulding, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 709, 470 N.E.2d at 399. The drainage claim
probably fits within the concept of economic harm, but damage to vegetation is more of
an aesthetic injury.
163. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also discussion supra
part I.B analyzing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decisions.
164. See Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129,597 N.E.2d 48
(1992).
165. Id. The other decisions in this line include: Riley v. Janco Cent., Inc., 38
Mass. App. Ct. 984, 652 N.E.2d 631 (1995), review denied, 421 Mass. 1108,659 N.E.2d
287 (1996); Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 956, 642 N.E.2d 1054 (1994);
Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 641 N.E.2d 125 (1994),
affd, 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369 (1996); Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health &
Retardation Ass'n, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 642 N.E.2d 599 (1994), affd in part and rev'd
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key contributions to the doctrine of standing. First, Barvenik firmly
rejects any suggestion in Tsagronis, Paulding or Butts that noneco
nomic harm alone is a sufficient basis for standing. Second, the de
cision signals that plaintiffs will be required to demonstrate
standing by appropriate proof at every stage in the proceedings.
These two themes are consistently repeated by the Massachusetts
Appeals Court in the decisions of the Barvenik line..
Barvenik involved a typical spat between neighbors and a suc
cessful permit applicant. Plaintiffs were various landowners living
near the site of a former school, which was to be converted to 114
housing units for the elderly, as authorized by a special permit is
sued by the Board of Aldermen. The site was zoned for multi-fam
ily use. The plaintiffs resided in a single family residence district;
they complained that the development of the site would create a
general increase in traffic and noise, change the character and ap
pearance of the neighborhood, and result in drainage problems. l66
After a seven-day trial, the land court upheld the standing of five of
the plaintiffs to contest the special permit, but affirmed the local
decision for the permittees on its merits.167
The appeals court ruled that it need not reach the merits of the
case because the plaintiffs were without standing to contest the
matter. 168 The court noted that the plaintiffs, as parties in interest,
were entitled to a presumption of aggrieved person status. 169 Addi
tionally, the court reiterated the consequences of a contest:
Once a defendant ... offers evidence to support the challenge ...
the jurisdictional issue is to be decided on the basis of the evi
dence with no benefit to the plaintiff from the presumption. The
plaintiff then has the burden of proof on the issue of standing.
in part, 421 Mass. 106,653 N.E.2d 589 (1995) (further appellate review was granted
the Supreme Judicial Court's decision is discussed in part V of this Article, infra); C0
hen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 624 N.E.2d 119 (1993), review
denied, 417 Mass. 1102,631 N.E.2d 58 (1994); Jaffe v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 34 Mass.
App. Ct. 929, 612 N.E.2d 693 (1993).
166. Barvenik,33 Mass. App. Ct. at 134 n.ll, 597 N.E.2d at 52 n.ll.
167. The standing of the plaintiffs was challenged by the defendants in pretrial
motions, without success. Id. at 131 n.6, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.6. In its post-trial decision,
the lower court ruled that five abutter plaintiffs had standing, but that the remaining
plaintiffs did not.
168. Id. at 130, 597 N.E.2d at 50. Defendants "extensively briefed the issue" on
appeal. "Plaintiffs' brief on appeal did not discuss the subject of standing." Id. at 131
n.6, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.6. This certainly did not improve the plaintiff's chances.
169. Id. at 131,597 N.E.2d at 50. Because the plaintiffs resided in a different (and
not substantially similar) zoning district, the second presumption, favoring those seek
ing to uphold the integrity of the district, was not available. Id. at 139,597 N.E.2d at 55.
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Satisfaction of that burden requires proof that the plaintiff is one
of the limited class of individuals who are entitled to challenge a
zoning board's exercise of discretion. 17o

Here, however, the tone of the court significantly departed from
past standing decisions. First,the court gave short shrift to most of
the plaintiffs' claimed injuries, stating that "[s]ubjective and un
specific fears about the possible impairment of aesthetics or neigh
borhood appearance, incompatible architectural styles, the dimin
ishment of close neighborhood feeling, or the loss of open or
natural space are all considered insufficient bases for aggrievement
under Massachusetts law."171 The court characterized these con
cerns as "sincere," but concluded that it was "angst insufficient" for
standing. 172 .
In contrast, the court identified "legitimate zoning-related con
cerns, including possible vehicular traffic increases, anticipated
parking problems, and the potential for litter."173 In order to prove
the special and different kind of injury necessary for standing, a
plaintiff must show that these legitimate zoning-related concerns
will result
if not in a diminution in the value of his property, at least in his
property or legal rights being more adversely affected by the ac
tivity authorized by the permit than (a) they are by present uses
and activities or (b) they would be as a result of the uses and
activities permitted as of right on the defendant's locusP4

Otherwise, even a party in interest lacks standing.
Barvenik's purge of noneconomic injuries from standing has
some troubling aspects. The appeals court's contention that aes
thetic harm is "considered [an] insufficient bas[i]s for aggrievement
under Massachusetts law" is, no doubt, grounded in the decisions of
the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed in Part I of this Article. 175
However, it fails to account for 1975 Massachusetts Acts 808, sec
170. Id. at 131-32, 597 N.E.2d at 50-51 (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. at 132-33, 597 N.E.2d at 51. See also id. at 134 n.l1, 597 N.E.2d at 52
n.l1. The court took pains to distinguish the Commonwealth's doctrine of standing
from "more expansive" federal law. Id. at 132 n.9, 597 N.E.2d at 51 n.9.
172. Id. at 135, 597 N.E.2d at 52-53.
173. Id. at 133, 597 N.E.2d at 51.
174. Id. The court offered no legal precedent for its alternative measures of in
jury in the absence of diminished value. They are grounded in common sense, in that a
plaintiff cannot complain of injury where the new activity would be less onerous than
the existing use and less onerous than uses available as of right.
175. Id. at 132-33,597 N.E.2d at 51. See also id. at 134 n.11, 597 N.E.2d at 52
n.11. See discussion supra part I.
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tion 2A, which states that zoning may be used to accomplish aes
thetic goals:
This section is designed to suggest objectives for which zoning
might be established which include, but are not limited to, the
following: - to lessen congestion in the streets; to conserve
health; to secure safety from fire, flood, panic and other dangers;
to provide adequate light and air; to prevent overcrowding of
land, to avoid undue concentration of population; to encourage
housing for persons of all income levels; to facilitate the adequate
provision of transportation, water, water supply, drainage, sewer
age, schools, parks, open space and other public requirements; to
conserve the value of land and buildings, including the conserva
tion of natural resources and the prevention of blight and pollu
tion of the environment; to encourage the most appropriate use
of land throughout the city or town, including consideration of
the recommendations of the master plan, if any, adopted by the
planning board and the comprehensive plan, if any, of the re
gional planning agency; and to preserve and increase amenities
by the promulgation of regulations to fulfill said objectives. Said
regulations may include but are not limited to restricting, prohib
iting, permitting or regulating:
1. uses of land, including wetlands and lands deemed sub
ject to seasonal or periodic flooding;
2. size, height, bulk, location and use of structures, includ
ing buildings and signs except that billboards, signs and
other advertising devices are also subject to the provisions of
sections twenty-nine through thirty-three, inclusive, of chap
ter ninety-three, and to chapter ninety-three D;
3. uses of bodies of water, including water courses;
4. noxious uses;
5. areas and dimensions of land and bodies of water to be
occupied or unoccupied by uses and structures, courts, yards
and open spaces;
6. density of population and intensity of use;
7. accessory facilities and uses, such as vehicle parking and
loading, landscaping and open space; and
8. the development. of the natural, scenic and aesthetic
qualities of the communityP6

Section 2A has been cited as a guide to the legitimate exercise of
the zoning power.!77 Nowhere does section 2A subordinate
176. 1975 MASS. Acrs 808, § 2A.
177. See MacNeil v. Town of Avon, 386 Mass. 339, 341,435 N.E.2d 1043, 1045
(1982); Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 253, 402 N.E.2d 1346, 1350-51
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noneconomic to economk objectives.118 In fact, the Supreme Judi
cial Court of Massachusetts has ruled that the police power is
properly exercised even when the sole governmental objective is
aesthetic in nature. 179
It is open to contention that, by legitimizing economic harm
and ignoring aesthetic injury, the court has lost sight of the changes
to zoning law dating from the mid-1970s. Why does "potential for
litter" constitute a legitimate zoning-related concern while "impair
ment of aesthetics or neighborhood appearance" does not? Both
share equal billing in section 2A. Is it because the court sees a link
between litter and the diminution of property values that is not ap
parent when considering aesthetic impacts? This approach ignores
a wealth of case law that points in the opposite direction. For ex
ample, in Chorzempa v. City ofHuntsville,180 the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld a municipal junkyard ordinance grounded
in aesthetics and economics, stating that "current authorities recog
nize neighborhood aesthetics to be integrally bound to property
values and to be relevant considerations in zoning when they bear
in a substantial way upon land utilization."181 Similarly, in State ex
reI. Columbia Tower, Inc. v. Boone County, 182 the court ruled that
aesthetic considerations were "inextricably entwined with property
values." Recent commentary indicates that the diminution in prop
(1980); Hunters Brook Realty Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 76,
81,436 N.E.2d 978,982 (1982). These extensive powers "are not to be narrowly inter
preted." Collura v. Town of Arlington, 367 Mass. 881, 885, 329 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1975)
(citing Decoulos v. City of Peabody, 360 Mass. 428. 429, 274 N.E.2d 816, 818 (1971».
See also Sturges, 380 Mass. at 253 n.ll, 402 N.E.2d at 1351 n.ll.
178. Section 2A may serve to distinguish zoning from other administrative con
texts in which standing is an issue. In Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374
Mass. 37, 46, 371 N.E.2d 728, 737 (1977), quoted in Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491,493 n.5, 540 N.E.2d 182,185 n.5, review denied,
405 Mass. 1204,542 N.E.2d 602 (1989), the court noted that "when an issue involves an
area of law governed by a specific statute with a standing requirement, that issue is
governed by the standing requirements of the particular statute and not by a general
grant of standing." The court cited the Zoning Act as an example of such a "specific
statute." Boston Edison, 374 Mass. at 46, 371 N.E.2d at 737.
179. John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 218, 339
N.E.2d 709, 717 (1975) (ruling that a Brookline measure addressing billboards was
valid).
180. 643 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
181. Id. at 1024 (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citing Township of Livingston v. Marchev, 205 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964».
182. 829 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). See also Coscan Washington, Inc. v.
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 590 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991).
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erty value caused by aesthetic harm can readily be quantified. 183
Barvenik's dismissal of aesthetic harm without explanation fails to
account for the trend linking aesthetics with property values. 184
Barvenik's second contribution to the doctrine of standing is its
clear statement of the Massachusetts Appeals Court's evidentiary
expectations. The "plaintiff must establish-by direct facts and not
by speCUlative personal opinion-that his injury is special and dif
ferent."185 The plaintiff must "offer more than conjecture and hy
pothesis. He must provide specific evidence demonstrating a
reasonable likelihood" of injury.1 86 Citing Lujan II, Justice Lau
rence calibrated his evidentiary expectations to the stage of
litigation.187
The court also commented on the need for expert testimony to
prove legitimate zoning-related concerns:
As a cautionary observation, we do not intend to suggest that
plaintiffs asserting zoning aggrievement can never succeed, once
their standing is contested, without producing expert witnesses
on their behalf. The need for expert testimony depends, as in all
cases, upon the trial judge's discretionary determination whether
or not the subject matter is beyond the scope of the common
knowledge, experience and understanding of the trier of fact
without expert assistance. Here, the judge acknowledged the
value of expert testimony with respect to the issues of traffic and
water distribution and expressly noted that the issues of water
pressure, site drainage, storm drainage, and landscaping were
"technical questions" and "specialized matters. "188

The issues deemed technical in the trial court cover considerable
ground in virtually every zoning appeaL While the court stops short
183. See, e.g., George P. Smith II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty:
An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVIL. L. REV. 53 (1991).
'''[There is] no lack of data for making adjustments based on aesthetic factors. View
and proximity to a noxious use are just other variables in the marketplace the measure
ment of which is no more subjective than many other factors commonly valued.'" Id. at
76 (quoting Interview with Arnold S. Tesh, Chairman of the Capital Region Chapter of
the American Society of Real Estate Counselors, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17,1990)).
184. Columbia Tower, 829 S.W.2d at 536. Indeed, in her influential article, Bev
erly A. Rowlett argues that aesthetic concerns and diminution of property values are
two sides of the same coin. See Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the
Police Power: The New General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34
VAND. L. REv. 603, 622-23 (1981).
185. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132, 597 N.E.2d 48,
51 (1992).
186. Id. at 133, 597 N.E.2d at 5l.
187. Id. at 133 n.9, 597 N.E.2d at 51 n.9.
188. Id. at 138 n.13, 597 N.E.2d at 54 n.l3 (citation omitted).
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of requiring expert testimony, a prudent plaintiff is left with little
option.
The evidentiary expectations of the court come to life in its
review of the trial testimony of the plaintiffs.1 89 In a long footnote,
the court dismissed the testimony of the five abutters as "'the ex
pression of aesthetic views and speculative opinions."'19o The first
plaintiff's fear of traffic impacts was not limited to the project in
question; it related to any project" 'up in that area. "'191 The second
plaintiff objected primarily to the appearance and density of the
elderly housing proposal.192 Another was concerned about neigh
borhood charaeter. 193 For the fourth plaintiff, loss of the site as rec
reational land and noise were key.194 The last neighbor cited
neighborhood character and unsubstantiated traffic concerns. 195
The court conceded that one of the plaintiffs alluded to a fear of
increased water drainage onto his site, "a fear which would, if sub
stantiated, have constituted cognizable injury on which to base
standing."196 However, the defendant's uncontested expert testi
mony regarding drainage demonstrated that run-off would not be a
problem.197
Barvenik evokes two reactions. The first is that the decision is
consistent with evidentiary and doctrinal precedent in the area of
standing. 198 Barvenik purges noneconomic injury from standing in
keeping with the Supreme Judicial Court's rule. 199 It states, in reli
ance on Lujan II, the same evidentiary burden on plaintiffs as does
the United States Supreme Court. The other reaction is the source
of its controversy. Simply put, Barvenik restores an intellectual
189. The court also discussed the amount and nature of the evidence necessary to
destroy the plaintiffs presumption of aggrievement. Id. at 132 n.7, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.7.
The court cited various standards without endorsing any particular one. Id.
190. Id. at 134 n.11, 597 N.E.2d at 52 n.11 (quoting Harvard Square Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 493, 540 N.E.2d 182, 185, review
denied,405 Mass. 1204,542 N.E.2d 602 (1989».
191. Id. (quoting Harvard Square, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 493, 540 N.E.2d at 185).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 137, 597 N.E.2d at 54.
197. Id. at 138, 597 N.E.2d at 54.
198. The one caveat would be Justice Laurence's test for injury, which was never
based on precedent, and which was rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts in Marashlian. See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 660
N.E.2d 369 (1996). See also discussion infra part V.
199. For a discussion criticizing this rule, see supra notes 175-84 and accompany
ing text.
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rigor to the issue of standing. As Part III of this Article reviews,
reported challenges in the pre-Barvenik era were rare. Plaintiffs
generally survived because defendants either failed to contest the
issue or did so insufficiently.20o Only ten days before Barvenik, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the standing of a plaintiff
whose only evidence of injury-diminution of value caused by loss
of view, no less-was his own testimony.201 In this complacent at
mosphere, where presumptions reigned, it is understandable that
Barvenik represented a shocking change in tone.
A.

Subsequent Decisions by the Massachusetts Appeals Court

The Massachusetts Appeals Court remained remarkably con
sistent in its approach to the issue of standing in the three years
following Barvenik. The court was presented with opportunities to
explore the issue in various contexts: motions to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1), motions for summary judgment, and, like Barvenik,
at the post-trial stage. The decisions since Barvenik were notable
chiefly for their contributions to evidentiary issues. The important
aspects of these later decisions are reviewed below.
In laffe v. Zoning Board of Appeals ,202 the court examined the
standing of Thomas and Luan White, who had complained to the
board that certain zoning violations existed on the Jaffes' property.
The board agreed with the Whites, and the Jaffes appealed. The
property of the Whites was located in a single-family residence dis
trict; the Jaffes resided in a district zoned for multi-family use. The
distance between the two premises was 480 feet, with seven houses
separating the parties. On the Jaffes' motion for summary judg
ment, the trial court ruled that the Whites were without standing to
bring the action because they did not own property in the same
district. 203
Only nine months earlier, in Barvenik, the Massachusetts Ap
peals Court had noted that "no cases have yet recognized standing
in such plaintiffs."204 Now, a different panel of the appeals court
ruled that, while no presumption benefitted the Whites, standing
200.
201.
rev'd, 415
See id.
202.

See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 596 N.E.2d 369 (1992),
Mass. 329,613 N.E.2d 893 (1993). Tsagronis was decided on July 24, 1992.

34 Mass. App. Ct. 929,612 N.E.2d 693 (1993).
Id. at 930, 612 N.E.2d at 694.
204. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129,139 n.15, 597 N.E.2d
48, 55 n.15 (1992). This was an issue raised, but left unanswered, in Barvenik. Id.
203.
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was not barred if they could demonstrate the requisite injury. The
Whites submitted no affidavits from experts. Instead, Thomas
White's affidavit alleged that noise emanating from the Jaffes'
premises and an increase in pedestrian traffic had caused diminu
tion in his property values. The court ruled that the claim of in
creased pedestrian traffic, regardless of its effect on values, "may
have an impact on a party's property interest so as to give him
standing."205 Thus, the Whites barely satisfied the evidentiary
threshold required at the summary judgment stage. 206 The matter
was remanded for trial.
Cohen v. Zoning Board of Appeals207 is the Massachusetts Ap
peals Court's definitive post-Barvenik treatment of standing in the
context of a trial court's summary judgment. The panel wrestled
with a multi-party appeal of a special permit. The special permit
authorized the construction of a shopping center in an area zoned
"arterial commercial."208 The plaintiffs were the owners of two
nearby parcels, both within the same district as the subject par
cel.209 One of the plaintiffs' parcels, home to a Dunkin' Donuts,
abutted the site. A supermarket was planned for development on
the non-abutting vacant parcel. On cross motions for summary
judgment, the judge of the land court ruled that the abutting plain
tiffs did not have the requisite injury for standing. The judge also
held that the non-abutting plaintiffs were precluded from standing
by virtue of their business competition with the permittee.210
The trial court, and the appeals court on review, relied on the
United States Supreme Court's Lujan II ruling to measure the
plaintiffs' claims. 211 The court first ruled that the defendants' evi
205. Jaffe, 34 Mass. App. O. at 931, 612 N.E.2d at 695. However, the laffes
noted, in their appellate brief, that the Whites live across the street from Boston Col
lege and dormitories which house approximately 900 students. Brief for Appellants at
9, Jaffe, 34 Mass. App. O. 929, 612 N.E.2d 693 (No. 91-P-183).
206. Jaffe, 34 Mass. App. O. at 931, 612 N.E.2d at 695. The court suggested that
if diminution in value were White's only complaint, he may not have presented suffi
cient evidence to withstand summary judgment. Id.
207. 35 Mass. App. O. 619,624 N.E.2d 119 (1993), review denied, 417 Mass. 1102,
631 N.E.2d 58 (1994).
208. Id. at 620, 624 N.E.2d at 120.
209. Id. at 620, 624 N.E.2d at 121.
210. Id. at 621 n.3, 624 N.E.2d at 121 n.3. The appeals court did not reach the
issue of whether a business competitor is always precluded from status as an aggrieved
person.
211. [d. at 621, 624 N.E.2d at 121. See Lujan 11,504 U.S. 555 (1992). The court
noted that Lujan II is consistent with Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass.
706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734, 740 (1991).
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dence, consisting of deposition transcripts, was sufficient to destroy
the plaintiffs' presumption of standing. The plaintiffs, in turn, al
leged that traffic impacts from the proposed shopping center would
adversely affect their properties. 212 They submitted an affidavit
from a professional traffic engineer to buttress their claim of injury.
The appeals court, as did the land court before it, shredded the affi
davit. The engineer predicted that the proposed shopping center
would cause "increased delays in traffic flow, a reduced ability of
patrons of Dunkin' Donuts to make left turns ... and a likelihood
that, because of lines of vehicles on [the] street, ... patrons will be
impeded from getting in or out of the Dunkin' Donuts parcel."213
The court characterized this affidavit as focusing on the impact of
traffic on "patrons of the Dunkin' Donuts parcel."214 The predic
tion was flawed because it did not identify injury to the owners of
the parce1. 215 Over the plaintiffs' argument that the court was im
posing too stringent a Rule 56 standard,216 the trial court was af
212. In addition to raising traffic as grounds for standing, the plaintiffs made two
lesser claims. They alleged that they were aggrieved by the failure of the shopping
centers to conform to the site grading and topography requirements of the zoning by
law. Cohen, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 620, 624 N.E.2d at 121. Furthermore, as land owners
in the same district, they claimed that they were entitled to standing because they
sought to preserve the integrity of the district. This latter contention came too late in
the game. Id. at 624, 624 N.E.2d at 123. In any event, the plaintiffs did not identify the
interest they sought to protect. Id. at 624 n.5, 624 N.E.2d at 123 n.5.
213. Id. at 623, 624 N.E.2d at 122.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. The plaintiffs' appellate brief noted that "[t ]he opinion of an expert is not to
be dismissed as a 'generalized assertion of opinion' so long as it is 'sufficiently substan
tial ... to raise an apparent issue of fact' and if so, it will suffice to avoid summary
judgment." Brief for Appellants at 22 n.7, Cohen, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 624 N.E.2d
119 (No. 93-P-785) (quoting Noble v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 34 Mass. App.
Ct. 397, 4()3, 612 N.E.2d 250, 254, review denied, 415 Mass. 1105, 616 N.E.2d 469
(1993». The footnote continued by paraphrasing Noble:
The Court in Noble held that in opposing a motion for summary judgment a
plaintiff need not show a "perfect case": "[a] reasonable measure of doubt
may be tolerated because 'all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary
judgment.'"
Id. at 22-23 n.7 (citing Noble, 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 402, 612 N.E.2d at 254 (alteration in
original) (citations omitted».
The plaintiffs' brief makes many of the same arguments as those rejected by the
Supreme Court in Lujan I and Lujan II. Justice Blackmun dissented in both decisions.
In Lujan I, he wrote:
The requirement that evidence be submitted is satisfied here. . . . There re
mains the question whether the allegations in these affidavits were sufficiently
precise to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e). The line of demarcation
between "specific" and "conclusory" allegations is hardly a bright one ....
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firmed. "In the circumstances, the general and conclusory
allegations of the affidavit cannot be transformed by inference into
genuine triable issues."217
Two of the Massachusetts Appeals Court's post-Barvenik
standing decisions invited further appellate review. 218 In the first,
Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n,219 the
appeals court ruled that abutters to a proposed home for mentally
handicapped persons were not aggrieved. The appeals court, noting
that matters outside the pleadings had been presented to the trial
judge at the hearing, erroneously characterized the defendant's mo
tion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) as a motion for summary
judgment.22o The court, citing Barvenik and Lujan II, then applied
the tougher standards associated with Rule 56 to find that the plainThe question, it should be emphasized, is not whether the [plaintiff] has
proved that it has standing to bring this action, but simply whether the materi
als before the [trial court] established "that there is a genuine issue for trial,"
concerning the [plaintiff's] standing. In light of the principle that "[o]n sum
mary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained
in [evidentiary] materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion," I believe that the evidence before the [trial court]
raised a genuine factual issue as to [the plaintiff's] standing to sue.
Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 902-03 (1989) (Blackmun. J., dissenting) (fourth and fifth altera
tions in original) (citations omitted). See also Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 589-93 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Cohen, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 623, 624 N.E.2d at 122.
218. The Massachusetts Appeals Court has also rendered three lesser decisions in
which it has steadfastly applied Barvenik. See Riley v. Janco Cent., Inc., 38 Mass. App.
Ct. 984,652 N.E.2d 631 (1995), review denied, 421 Mass. l1OS, 659 N.E.2d 287 (1996);
Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 956, 642 N.E.2d 1054 (1994); Monks v. Zon
ing Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 685,642 N.E.2d 314 (1994), review denied, 419
Mass. 1106, 646 N.E.2d 1070 (1995). Reagan and Riley are rescript opinions. Monks is
arguably the most interesting of the three. On the standing question, the trial court
issued summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appeals court in Monks ruled
that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a special permit issued for a cellular phone
tower measuring 180 feet in height and located approximately 1500 feet away from their
home. The plaintiffs complained that the tower would cause a diminution in the value
of their property, emit harmful microwaves, and impact the visual quality of the neigh
borhood. Ordinarily, the court noted, the visual impact claim would not qualify a plain
tiff for standing. In this case, however, the Plymouth zoning by-law specifically
indicated that the board of appeals was to consider "the visual character or quality of
the neighborhood" as a special permit criterion. Monks, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 688, 642
N.E.2d at 316. This "created and defined a protected interest" which the plaintiffs had
standing to assert. Id.
219. 37 Mass. App. Ct. 657,642 N.E.2d 599 (1994), affd in part and rev'd in part,
421 Mass. 106,653 N.E.2d 589 (1995).
220. Id. at 661-63, 642 N.E.2d at 602-03. See the Supreme Judicial Court's discus
sion in Watros, 421 Mass. at 107-09,653 N.E.2d at 590-92, which is reviewed infra, part
V. The Supreme Judicial Court corrected the procedural error and found that the
plaintiffs had standing to proceed.
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tiffs did not qualify for aggrieved person status.221
The second decision accepted for further appellate review was
Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, a rescript opinion. 222 The
Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected standing for plaintiffs who
claimed that a proposed complex would cause traffic and parking
injuries. The lower court found; after the trial, that the plaintiffs
had standing. The court also ruled that the permits in question
were validly issued because the project would not cause traffic and
parking problems. The appeals court characterized the trial court's
ruling as inconsistent and erroneous. 223 Where traffic and parking
were not aggravated by the project, the appeals court determined
that the matter should be dismissed for lack of standing. After trial,
the plaintiffs' claimed injuries were demonstrably nonexistent.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court's post-Barvenik decisions
reveal an absolute reversal in this trend. In six of the eight deci
sions (including Barvenik), the plaintiffs were denied standing. Five
of the six rejected plaintiffs were parties in interest. 224 This con
trasts with a success rate of more than seventy percent for parties in
interest in the pre-Barvenik era. 225 Of the two successful plaintiffs,
one was protected by a unique local by-law provision;226 the other
was located 480 feet from the subject property.227 In both of these
decisions, rendered by the trial courts in the context of a motion for
summary judgment, the Massachusetts Appeals Court was quick to
point out that a Rule 56 determination of standing does not pre
221. Watros, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 664-66, 642 N.E.2d at 603-05. According to the
appeals court, the plaintiffs
submitted no affidavits or other material to establish the requisite adversity of
impact to their peculiar rights. The unverified allegations of their complaint
were entitled to no consideration in evaluating the matter, and provided no
specific facts as to the impact of the proposed project on them in any event.
Id. at 666, 642 N.E.2d at 604-05 (citations omitted).
222. 37 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 641 N.E.2d 125 (1994), affd, 421 Mass. 719, 660
N.E.2d 369 (1996).
223. [d. at 932, 641 N.E.2d at 126.
224. The plaintiff in Reagan-the other jilted claimant-was located more than
one-half mile from the site in question. See Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct.
956,956,642 N.E.2d 1054, 1055 (1994).
225. See discussion supra part III. Ten of 14 parties in interest were awarded
standing in appellate decisions prior to Barvenik.
226. See supra note 218 discussing Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass.
App. Ct. 685, 642 N.E.2d 314 (1994).
227. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text discussing Jaffe v. Zoning
Bd., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 612 N.E.2d 693 (1993).
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elude a later assessment of the issue at the trial stage. 228 In short,
there is hardly any good news for plaintiffs.
B.

Trial Courts

A survey of iand court decisions during the period from 1993
to 1995, indicates that Barvenik had an enormous impact on the
trial courts. The results are striking:
FIGURE 1
LAND COURT STANDING DECISIONS
1993-1995

For Defendant
For Plaintiff

1993229

1994230

1995 231

Total

6
1

6
1

5
4

17
6

Most of the standing decisions, fourteen of twenty-three, were en
228.

[d. at 931,612 N.E.2d at 695; Monks, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 689,642 N.E.2d at

316.
229. Daddario v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 195
(Mass. Land. Ct. Dec. 1, 1993); Herrick v. Board of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass.
Landlaw) 174 (Mass. Land. Ct. Sept. 21, 1993); Devereaux v. Board of Appeals, 1 Land
Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 147 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 9, 1993); Napier v. Board of
Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 144 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 5, 1993); Cohen v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 48 (Mass. Land Ct. April 26,
1993); Bringhurst v. Planning Bd., 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 12 (Mass. Land Ct.
Jan 22, 1993); Greene v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep (Mass. Landlaw) 8
(Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 20, 1993).
230. Siepel v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 151
(Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 17, 1994); Century House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land
Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 148 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 26, 1994); Covell v. Board of
Appeals,2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 78 (Mass. Land Ct. May 9, 1994); Phelan v.
Board of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 60 (Mass. Land Ct. April 6, 1994);
Meharg v. Board of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 37 (Mass. Land Ct. Feb.
7, 1994); Porter v. Town of Dartmouth, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 96 (Mass.
Land Ct. Jan. 20, 1994); Waldron v. Dartmouth Planning Bd., 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass.
Landlaw) 3 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 5, 1994).
231. Hirsch v. Board of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 238 (Mass.
Land Ct. Dec. 27, 1995); Lucas v. Belmont Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep.
(Mass. Landlaw) 198 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 18, 1995); Wayland v. Andover Zoning Bd.,
3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 197 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 13, 1995); Nixon v. Ipswich
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 121 (Mass. Land Ct. June 13,
1995); King v. Cambridge Bd. of Zoning Appeal, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 118
(Mass. Land Ct. June 5, 1995); Rosenthal v. Millbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct.
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 115 (Mass. Land Ct. June 2, 1995); Howard v. Planning & Zoning
Bd.,3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 77 (Mass. Land Ct. March 31, 1995); Connors v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 19 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 12,
1995).
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tered after trial. Nine of the decisions were entered at the summary
judgment stage. No decisions were entered pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).
Parties in interest generally fared quite poorly:
FIGURE 2
PARTIES IN INTEREST AT THE LAND COURT
1993-1995
1993
Standing
No Standing

1994
1233
3236

1995

Total
5

12

This trend is confirmed by a cursory check of decisions in the supe
rior courts during the period from 1994 to 1995, as reported in Mas
sachusetts Lawyers Weekly. In his feature article, Robert A. Cohen
traced the impact of Barvenik on five trial decisions, all siding with
defendants on the issue of standing. 238 In four decisions of the su
perior courts between 1994 to 1995, reported in Massachusetts Law
yers Weekly, plaintiffs obtained standing in the pretrial stages of
litigation. 239
232. Herrick, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 174.
233. Siepel,2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 15I.
234. Wayland, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 197; Rosenthal. 3 Land Ct.
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 115; Connors, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 19.
235. Daddario v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 195
(Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 1, 1993); Devereaux v. Board of Appeal, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass.
Landlaw) 147 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 9, 1993); Napier v. Board of Appeals, 1 Land Ct.
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 144 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 5. 1993); Bringhurst v. Planning Bd., 1
Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 12 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 22, 1993); Greene v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 8 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan 20, 1993).
236. Century House. Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass.
Landlaw) 140 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 26, 1994); Phelan v. Board of Appeals, 2 Land Ct.
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 60 (Mass. Land Ct. April 6, 1994); Waldron v. Dartmouth
Planning Bd., 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 3 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 5, 1994).
237. Hirsch v. Board of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 238 (Mass.
Land Ct. Dec. 27, 1995); Lucas v. Belmont Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep.
(Mass. Landlaw) 198 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct 18, 1995); Sledz v. Tewksbury Planning Bd., 3
Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 159 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 22, 1995); Howard v.
Planning & Zoning Bd., 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 77 (Mass. Land Ct. March 31,
1995).
238. The decisions were collected and reported in Robert A. Cohen, Clearing the
Standing Barrier in Boston Zoning Appeals, MASS. LAW WKLY., Aug. 15, 1994, at 33, 36.
239. See Shaw Corp. v. Souza, 4 Mass. L. Rep. (Mass. L. Book Co.) 161 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 29, 1995); Serio v. Sturbridge Planning Bd., 4 Mass. L. Rep. (Mass. L.
Book Co.) 70 (Mass. Super. Ct. April 28, 1995); Jamieson v. Pellegrini, 3 Mass. L. Rep.

1996]

C.

THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED" STANDARD

425

Conclusion

Barvenik obviously inspired considerable adherence in later
panels of the Massachusetts Appeals Court and in the trial courts.
At the appeals court, six of the eight subsequent decisions resulted
in a finding that plaintiffs were without standing to contest the is
sue. Of the twenty-three relevant decisions of the Massachusetts
Land Court in the period from 1993 to 1995, nineteen cited
Barvenik, including fourteen of the seventeen decisions that re
sulted in a finding of no standing.

v.

BARVENIK AT 1HE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has been
presented with three opportunities to review standing in the post
Barvenik era. The first of these decisions, Tsagronis v. Board of
Appeals, signaled the contentiousness of the issue later made ap
parent in the third decision, Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Ap
peals.240 The focus of the second post-Barvenik decision, Watros v.
Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n, was primarily
procedural and did not substantially alter the Barvenik test for in
jury.241 In Marashlian, however, the Supreme Judicial Court modi
fied two important aspects of the Barvenik decision. First, the court
reduced the Barvenik "comparable uses" balancing test to a mere
factor. Second, the court discouraged post hoc findings, based on a
failure to succeed on the merits, that a plaintiff lacked standing.
A.

The Tsagronis Decision

Tsagronis involved the standing of an adjoining landowner to
challenge a variance issued for the construction of a single-family
home on the last lot in a subdivision. Like the subject parcel, the
plaintiffs' parcel was undersized and lacked the requisite frontage.
In a decision rendered only eleven days before Barvenik, the Mas
sachusetts Appeals Court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the variance. 242 By virtue of their status as abutters and
because they resided in the same district as the subject parcel, the
(Mass. L. Book Co.) 237 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1994); Sainato v. Ninety-Nine W.,
Inc., 2 Mass. L. Rep. (Mass. L. Book Co.) 601 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1994).
240. See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369
(1996); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 415 Mass. 329, 613 N.E.2d 893 (1993).
241. See Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 421 Mass.
106, 653 N.E.2d 589 (1995).
242. See Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 59, 596 N.E.2d 369,
371-72 (1992), rev'd, 415 Mass. 329, 613 N.E.2d 893 (1993).
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plaintiffs were presumptively aggrieved persons. The plaintiffs tes
tified that the construction of the home would partially obstruct
their views of Buzzards Bay, resulting in a diminution of value. 243
Defendants failed to produce any evidence to contradict these con
tentions. 244 As a result, the appeals court ruled that the evidence
warranted a finding of standing.
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed in a divided opinion. 245
The court characterized the plaintiffs' testimony regarding ob
structed views and diminished value as "uncontroverted."246 For
the majority, this was determinative: "Indeed, on the uncontested
facts, the status of aggrieved party probably is compelled as a mat
ter of law."247 The dissent, however, was unsympathetic to the cru
cial claim of pecuniary harm. The dissent pointed out that "[t]here
was no evidence as to the value of the Tsagronises' [sic] lot at the
time of the hearing or what the value might be after construction of
the [defendant's] house, or whether the value would diminish even
more if the locus were used for purposes not requiring a vari
ance."248 In the dissent's view, the speculative opinion of the plain
tiff did not constitute plausible harm.
There is much in the Massachusetts high court's Tsagronis de
cision to suggest that Barvenik had been well-received at the
Supreme Judicial Court. Barvenik is not cited in Tsagronis, but the
243. Id. at 58-59, 596 N.E.2d at 371. The dissent in the Supreme Judicial Court's
Tsagronis decision noted that the plaintiffs also claimed harm from a diminution of light
and air, air pollution,.erosion, and wastewater discharge. Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 335
36 nn.2-3, 613 N.E.2d at 896-97 nn.2-3 (Abrams, J., dissenting). These issues were not
discussed by the appeals court.
244. Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 59, 596 N.E.2d at 372.
245. Justices Abrams, Liacos, and Lynch dissented in this four to three decision.
Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 329, 613 N.E.2d at 893.
246. Id. at 330 n.4, 613 N.E.2d at 894 n.4.
247. Id. The dissent suggested that the majority had "replaced the rebuttable
presumption ... with an automatic standing rule." Id. at 336 n.4, 613 N.E.2d at 897 nA.
However, the majority's position, grounded in the lack of evidence produced by the
defendants at trial, cannot be said to go this far. After all, the presumption only "re
cedes if the issue is contested." Redstone v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383,
385,416 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1981). Failure to' contest the issue would preserve the pre
sumption, not automatic standing. See LIACOS ET AL., supra note 113, at 235 ("A pre
sumption is rebuttable ... by evidence warranting a finding contrary to the presumed
fact."). As the Massachusetts Appeals Court noted in several pre-Barvenik rulings,
failure to contest standing leaves the presumption intact. See supra part III and accom
panying text for a discussion of the pre-Barvenik rulings.
248. Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 335, 613 N.E.2d at 896 (Abrams, J., dissenting). Ob
viously, this again raises the spectre of obligatory expert testimony to demonstrate
standing, here, presumably by an appraiser. See supra note 186 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this issue as raised in Barvenik.
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results are consistent, even complementary. The Tsagronis major
ity subscribed to a principle often announced by the Massachusetts
Appeals Court: Where the defendant fails to produce evidence suf
ficient to contest the presumption of aggrieved person status, the
presumption survives. 249 Nothing in Barvenik contradicts this prin
ciple. In fact, by delineating the evidentiary obligations of the par
ties, Barvenik demands nothing less.
The Tsagronis dissent also embraced elements of the Barvenik
holding. To gauge the plaintiffs' claim of diminished value, the dis
sent looked to alternative uses-here, campgrounds-that might, as
of right, be placed on the site. This is consistent with Justice Lau
rence's Barvenik formulation for injury in fact. 250 The dissent also
scrutinized the plaintiffs' various claims of harm, rejecting those in
juries not related to typical zoning disputes or reducible to pecuni
ary harm. Justice Laurence had reached similar conclusions
regarding legitimate zoning injuries in Barvenik. In short, nothing
in Tsagronis contemplates the Marashlian criticism of Barvenik.
B.

The Watros Decision

The second of the Supreme Judicial Court's· post-Barvenik
standing decisions focused on a narrow procedural question. In
Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n, the
court provided a blueprint for the treatment of motions to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Pro- .
cedure.251 The Massachusetts Appeals Court characterized such a
motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion where the mo
vant had submitted extra-pleading materials.252 The Massachusetts
Appeals Court, citing Barvenik and Lujan II, applied the tougher
standards associated with Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of
Civil Procedure to find that the plaintiffs did not qualify for ag
249. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Massa
chusetts Appeals Court's handling of the issue of the presumption.
250. In focusing on the other uses that might be made of the lot, the dissent asked
the equivalent of the Barvenik test for injury: Whether the plaintiffs property or legal
rights are "more adversely affected by the activity authorized by the permit than (a)
they are by present uses and activities or (b) they would be as a result of the uses and
activities permitted as of right on the ... locus." Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33
Mass. App. Q. 129, 133,597 N.E.2d 48, 51 (1992).
251. See Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 421 Mass.
106, 653 N.E.2d 589 (1995).
252. Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 37 Mass. App.
Q. 657, 661-63, 642 N.E.2d 599, 602-03 (1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 421 Mass.
106, 653 N.E.2d 589.
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grieved person<status. 253 The Supreme Judicial Court opted to ap
ply the more lenient standards associated with Rule 12(b)(1) to find
that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the permits. 254 The
court noted that no evidence was presented by the defendants at
the hearing to controvert the claim of standing. 255 Thus, the plain
tiffs "were entitled to rely entirely on their presumed status of being
aggrieved parties. "256 Warros is best characterized as a procedural
correction, not a repudiation, of the Barvenik line; it does not repu
diate the substantive aspects of the doctrine.
C.

The Marashlian Decision

Until 1996, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was
content to let the appeals court's view of standing develop without
significant comment. In Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
however, the Supreme Judicial Court wrestled with several key
components of the Barvenik decision. 257 The facts of the matter are
typical fare. The board of appeals issued a special permit and two
variances for the development of a hotel with a conference center
on Newburyport's waterfront. Two plaintiffs, each a party in inter
est, sought judicial review. The plaintiffs claimed that the proposed
development would cause disruption of neighborhood character, a
shortage of parking spaces, attendant traffic congestion, and various
problems (primarily noise and lighting) associated with the pro
posed valet parking services. 258 After trial, the judge ruled that the
plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action but that the board had
not exceeded its authority.259 In essence, the trial judge found that
253. Id. at 664-66, 642 N.E.2d at 603-05. The court found that the plaintiffs
submitted no affidavits or other material to establish the requisite adversity of
impact to their peculiar rights. The unverified allegations of their complaint
were entitled to no consideration in evaluating the matter ... and provided no
specific facts as to the impact of the proposed project on them in any event.
Id. at 666, 642 N.E.2d at 604-05 (citations omitted).
254. The Supreme Judicial Court viewed the matter as governed by Rule 12(b)(I)
despite the fact that summary judgment motions were also pending before the trial
court. Watros. 421 Mass. at 108-09,653 N.E.2d at 591. In a brief discussion, the court
pointed out that only Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are converted to Rule 56 mo
tions by the submittal of such materials. Id.
255. Id. at 111, 653 N.E.2d at 592.
256. Id. at 111, 653 N.E.2d at 593.
257. See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369
(1996).
258. These facts are summarized in Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 37
Mass. App. Ct. 931, 932, 641 N.E.2d 125, 126-27 (1994), affd, 421 Mass. at 719, 660
N.E.2d at 369.
259. Id. at 931, 641 N.E.2d at 126.
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the proposed complex would not cause any of the alleged problems.
Consequently, the special permit and variances were sustained on
the merits; the complex would not detrimentally affect the area.
The appeals court held that the trial judge's findings as to traf
fic, parking and the valet service militated against standing.260 The
appeals court's position was simple. The plaintiffs' claimed harm
stemmed from traffic and parking. The trial resulted in a finding
that there was no such harm: "Based on the judge's findings, [the
plaintiffs] have failed to make a 'specific showing that the plaintiffs
will either be injured or that such an injury would be special and
different from that which others throughout the zone would experi
ence . . . ."'261 In short, the appeals court ruled that it need not .
reach the merits of the board's decision because the plaintiffs'
claims of injury were not proved at trial.
The appeals court's decision in Marashlian inspired some nega
. tive reviews. Commentator Michael Halley, in Massachusetts Law
yers Weekly, was quite blunt:
The import of the Marashlian decision is a wholesale renuncia
tion of the very concept of standing as a threshold, jurisdictional
issue. The Appeals Court has held, in essence, that if a defendant
prevails on the merits, after trial, the plaintiff never had standing
to bring the claim in the first place.262
Mr. Halley argued that "[a]ggrievement ... means, if anything, a
colorable claim, not certain guaranteed success."263
This is the point of view that ultimately prevailed at the
Supreme Judicial Court in its Marashlian decision. Chief Justice
Liacos, who sided with the dissent in Tsagronis, wrote the majority
opinion. He cited Barvenik for the proposition that "[i]f standing is
challenged, the jurisdictional question is decided on 'all the evi
dence with no benefit to the plaintiffs from the presumption. "'264
However, Chief Justice Liacos noted that:
[A] review of standing based on "all the evidence" does not re
260. Id. at 933, 641 N.E.2d at 127.
261. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 623,
624 N.E.2d 119, 122-23 (1993), review denied, 417 Mass. 1102,631 N.E.2d 58 (1994».
262. Halley, supra note 13, at B4 (endnote omitted). Given that standing can be
raised "at any time," Mr. Halley's characterization of standing as a threshold issue is
more a statement of expectation than requirement.
263. Id.
264. Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 721,660 N.E.2d 369,
372 (1996) (quoting Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 131, 597
N.E.2d 48, 50 (1992».
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quire that the factfinder ultimately find a plaintiff's allegations
meritorious. To do so would be to deny standing, after the fact,
to any unsuccessful plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff must put forth
credible evidence to substantiate his allegations. In this context,
standing becomes, then, essentially a question of fact for the trial
judge. 265

It is plausible that a trial judge may conclude that the facts warrant

both a finding of standing and an adverse ruling on the merits.
Marashlian suggests that these are not inherently inconsistent
results.
In this regard, Marashlian resuscitates the oft-repeated propo
sition that "[t]he words 'person aggrieved' ... are not to be nar
rowly construed. "266 .On several occasions, the court reminds us
that "[t]he findings of the judge should not be overturned unless
'clearly erroneous. "'267 As the Supreme Judicial Court noted, the
appeals court's Marashlian decision turned on a reinterpretation of
the trial judge's findings, which otherwise supported standing for
the plaintiffs.268 In general, "[a] trial judge's findings of aggrieved
person status are entitled to deference."269 The rulirig of the ap
peals court did not comport with this standard.
The court used this opportunity to correct another key aspect
of the Barvenik ruling. Justice Laurence had fashioned a threshold
test for injury in fact. Plaintiffs must show:
[S]pecific evidence demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that
the [decision] will result, if not in a diminution in the value of his
property, at least in his property or legal rights being more ad
versely affected by the activity authorized by the permit than (a)
they are by present uses and activities or (b) they would be as a
result of the uses and activities permitted as of right on the ...
locus. 27o

.As noted in Part IV of this Article, this test is founded in pragma
tism, not precedent.271 To the Barvenik panel, common sense dic
tated that the plaintiff had no claim of injury where a new or
265. Id.
266. Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336 Mass. 199,204,143 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1957).
267. Marashlian,421 Mass. at 722, 660 N.E.2d at 372.
268. Id. at 723, 660 N.E.2d at 373.
269. Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 59, 596 N.E.2d 369, 372
(1992), rev'd, 415 Mass. 329,613 N.E.2d 893 (1993). See Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass.
App. Ct. 707, 709,470 N.E.2d 398,399 (1984).
270. Barvenik v. Board of Aldennen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133,597 N.E.2d 48,
51 (1992).
271. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.

1996]

THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED" STANDARD

431

proposed activity would be less onerous than the existing use, or
less onerous than uses available as of right. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts limited the Barvenik
formulation:
This line of cases appears to be a departure from those previously
decided . . . . We decline to adopt such a rule, except to the
extent that it requires specific facts to establish perceptible harm.
Although the magnitude of the threat of harm to a potential
plaintiff in retation to the threat of harm from a use permissible
as of right is a factor that may be considered, it is not dispositive
of the standing issue. 272
For this proposition, Chief Justice Liacos cited Justice Abrams's dis
sent in Tsagronis, in which he joined. 273 Justice Abrams had argued
in Tsagronis that the failure to consider the impact of alternative, or
as of right, uses on the subject parcel exposed the defects in the
plaintiffs' claim of diminished value. 274 However, he did not sug
gest that this analysis was a required element of every standing
contest.275
Marashlian, then, rejects two key aspects of the Barvenik line.
First, in a clear message to trial judges, the court reduced the bal
ancing test offered by Justice Laurence-focusing on comparable
uses-to a mere factor. The court held that this test should not be
determinative of the outcome without rejecting its application in
some form. Second, in an equally clear message to the appeals
court, the decision suggests that a finding after trial of standing for
plaintiffs is best left undisturbed. Where the trial judge's findings
are supported in the record, the usual standards of appellate review
demand deference. A decision on the merits for the permittee, cou
pled with a decision that the challengers nonetheless had standing
to bring suit, is not inherently inconsistent.
The Marashlian dissent was composed of Justice O'Connor, its
author, and Justices Lynch and Greaney. Only Justice Lynch held
over from the Tsagronis dissent. 276 The dissent did not necessarily
272.

Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 724, 660 N.E.2d at 373.
Id. See Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 334-35, 613 N.E.2d at 896 (Abrams, J., dis
senting). Chief Justice Liacos also cited Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Ap
peal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
274.' Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 334 & n.1, 613 N.E.2d at 896 & n.1 (Abrams, J.,
dissenting).
275. Id. at 335-36, 613 N.E.2d at 896-97.
276. The dissent objected to the trial judge's announced reliance on Sherrill
House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 274,473 N.E.2d 716, review denied,
394 Mass. 1103,477 N.E.2d 595 (1985). See Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 727, 660 N.E.2d at
273.
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disagree with the majority's prescription for deference. The dissent,
however, conceded only that the judge made the following relevant
findings:
(1) "The number of parking spaces to be provided for the Project
will be sufficient to meet the parking demands generated by the
hotel. Therefore, the Project will not add to any existing onstreet
parking congestion in the area"; (2) "[T]he supply of public park
ing spaces in the area will be adequate to meet the demand"; (3)
"With respect to traffic, the [P]roject is expected to minimally
increase traffic volumes and ... site-generated traffic will not
have a major impact on area traffic patterns. Any adverse traffic
impacts will be controlled by implementing certain mitigation
measures. "277

The dissent pointed out that there were no findings "suggesting that
the zoning board's actions are likely to result in harm to the plain
tiffs' legally protected interests."278 Consequently, the appeals
court's rescript opinion was characterized as appropriately deferen
tial. The judge had simply made an erroneous conclusion of law in
determining that his findings, although warranted, demonstrated
the plaintiffs' standing. In the dissent's view, the lower court's rul
ing was not entitled to the deference demanded by the majority.
CONCLUSION

Reaction to Marashlian was immediate. In the January 29,
1996 edition of Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, commentator Wil
liam V. Hovey summarized that the Marashlian decision shows "the
very confused state of the law regarding who is an 'aggrieved per
son' for purposes of challenging a variance .... The courts have
been all over the place on the standing issue-backwards, sideways
375 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The trial judge ruled, citing Sherrill House, that "[e]ven
if Snow and Marashlian were to prove no more than the likelihood of fear of harm on
the part of themselves, their visitors, clients and employees, they have standing to main
tain this action." Id. Justice O'Connor noted that the portion of Sherrill House relied
upon, however, was dictum, and. thus, the "judge's reasoning and ruling were incor
rect." Id. Furthermore. these types of "fears" (Sherrill House involved the siting of a
correctional facility) would "tend to diminish the market value of the Plaintiff's prop
erty," unlike the fears of Snow and Marashlian, which had to do with a hotel complex.
Id. at 728,660 N.E.2d at 375.
277. Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 729-30, 660 N.E.2d at 376 (O'Connor, J., dissent
ing) (alterations in original). A few other relevant, but minor, findings were also
detailed.
278. Id.
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and upside down."279 Hovey added that standing remains "a
chicken or the egg" problem: "[I]t is difficult to give definite advice
to a client who is considering a zoning challenge. "280
With a bit more time to ponder the issue, some post-Marash
lian considerations do emerge from the confusion. First, in the
realm of evidentiary expectations, Marashlian makes only a minor
adjustment to Barvenik. The decision certainly does nothing to dis
turb Barvenik's insistence upon rigorous proof of standing.
Marashlian, several times, demands "credible evidence to substanti
ate [the plaintiffs'] allegations."281 This is consistent with
Barvenik's statement of the evidentiary burden: The "plaintiff must
establish-by direct facts and not by speculative personal opinion
that his injury is special and different."282 There must be "specific
evidence demonstrating a reasonable likelihood" of injury.283
Marashlian undoubtedly preserves the Lujan II calibration of this
evidentiary burden, appropriate to the stage of litigation.
Marashlian also keeps intact the Barvenik concept of "legiti
mate zoning-related concerns" sufficient to provide standing.284
The plaintiffs' claim to standing turned on injuries attributable to
traffic and parking impacts. Justice Laurence had specifically cited
"possible vehicular traffic increases [and] anticipated parking
problems" as "legitimate" concerns.285 The Supreme Judicial
Court's Tsagronis decision, particularly the dissent, is also consis
tent with this formulation for zoning aggrievement. In the post
Marashlian era, "the possible impairment of aesthetics or neighbor
hood appearance, incompatible architectural styles, the diminish
ment of close neighborhood feeling, or the loss of open or natural
space" are not bases for standing.286
Marashlian does, however, slightly alter the evidentiary focus
attending injury in fact. Barvenik had suggested that in order to
prove the special and different kind of injury necessary for standing,
a plaintiff must show that these legitimate zoning-related concerns
279. Mark A. Cohen, Neighbors Challenge Variances For Hotel, Appeals Court
View On Standing Reversed, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 29, 1996, at AI, A35.
280. Id.
281. Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721,660 N.E.2d at 372.
282. Barvenik v. Board of Aldennen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132, 597 N.E.2d 48,
51 (1992).
283. Id. at 133, 597 N.E.2d at 51.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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will result if not in a diminution in the value of his property, at
least in his property or legal rights being more adversely affected
by the activity authorized by the permit than (a) they are by pres
ent uses and activities or (b) they would be as a result of the uses
and activities permitted as of right on the defendant's locus. 287

Marashlian reduces this balancing test to a factor for consideration.
Otherwise, Marashlian ensures that the spirit of Lujan II will per
vade the trial courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Marashlian's second realm reminds the Massachusetts Appeals
Court of the deference due to a trial judge's findings. To the extent
that this aspect of Marashlian is read narrowly, there is no funda
mental inconsistency with Barvenik. The findings of a lower court
cannot be disturbed unless· "clearly erroneous." Chief Justice
Liacos cited Building Inspector v. Sanderson 288 for the appropriate
standard: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."289 Further,
[i]n applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a
[trial] court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must con
stantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual
issues de novo. The authority of an appellate court, when re
viewing the findings of a judge as well as those of a jury, is cir
cumscribed by the deference it must give to decisions of the trier
of the fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and
weigh the evidence. The question for the appellate court under
Rule 52(a) is not whether it would have made the findings the
trial court did, but whether "on the entire evidence [it] is left with·
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."29o
Read narrowly, Marashlian merely reiterates that where the trial
judge finds standing warranted by the evidence, the appeals court,
except in the rare case, must accede.
However, Marashlian does not preclude the trial court from
'lJ37. Id. The court offered no legal precedent for its alternative measures of in
jury in the absence of diminished value. They are grounded in common sense, in that
the plaintiff cannot complain of injury where the new activity would be less onerous
than the existing use, and less onerous than uses available as of right.
'lJ38. 372 Mass. 157,360 N.E.2d 1051 (1977).
289. Id. at 160-61, 360 N.E.2d at 1053-54 (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
290. Id. at 161, 360 N.E.2d at 1054 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)) (third alteration in original).
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dismissing a matter, post-trial, for lack of standing. In this regard,
Marashlian is quite consistent with general principles reviewed in
Part II of this Article. The issue of standing may still be raised at
any time during the proceedings,291 addressed sua sponte,292 or
raised by a party for the first time at the appellate level,293 Marash
/ian does not reduce standing to a threshold device with a useful
lifespan limited to the pretrial phase of litigation.
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision keeps intact Barvenik's
two key contributions to the doctrine of standing: (1) rigorous proof
of injury tailored to the stage of the litigation, and (2) injury in fact
which is founded upon "legitimate zoning-related concerns." With
these guardians of the court house door still in place, Marashlian
can hardly be said to liberalize standing. The rigorous proof de
manded by Lujan II will ,bar many plaintiffs, particularly those with
only limited resources. The Lujan II standards are not likely to
change, since they are pinned to the rules of civil procedure.
Barvenik's concept of injury in fact, narrowly focused on "legiti
mate zoning-related concerns," will also exclude plaintiffs. For ac
cess to be significantly broadened, it is this concept which must be
changed.

291. See Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1484
(10th Cir. 1995); Board of County Comm'rs v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (10th
Cir.1993); Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. a. at 131 n.6, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.6 and cases cited
therein.
292. See, e.g., National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. Carey, 557
F.2d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 1977); Illinois Sporting Goods Ass'n v. County of Cook, 884 F.
Supp. 275, 282 (N.D. III. 1995); Borkowski v. Fraternal Order of Police, 155 F.R.D. 105,
111 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
293. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 412 Mass. 243, 248,
588 N.E.2d 639,642 (1992). The court in Prudential-Bache noted that "a party may not
argue for the first time on appeal that an opponent lacks standing to raise a constitu
tional issue that was presented below without any objection to the party's standing."
Id. (citing Aronson v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass. 244,247,516 N.E.2d 137,139 (1987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988». This, apparently, is one of the few limitations on
raising the issue of standing.

